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I. INTRODUCTION
When you own something you feel proud that you have got
something, but when they take that away from you, you feel na-
ked. You got nothing; there is nothing you have ... I personally
have got nothing to say "that was what I got from my grandfa-
ther or my mother or my grandpa or pa." I had nothing; they
took all what I had ... one thing that you've got to realize is that
the apartheid government did a lot of damage to us, the Blacks
in South Africa. They did a lot of damage.'
This is one of many poignant stories told by black South Africans who
were arbitrarily and brutally deprived of their property during the apart-
heid regime.2 In many ways the South African experience is not unique.
Past regimes in several other countries have also systematically took real
property from one group and gave it to another. These countries include
Zimbabwe, Namibia, US, Hungary, Israel, Nicaragua, Lithuania, Austra-
lia, Estonia, Canada, Latvia, Namibia, Kosovo, and Germany. Most
1. See Confidential Interview with two former residents of Kilnerton and one former
resident of Die Eland who were dispossessed under Apartheid, in Johannesburg and Cape
Town, S. Afr. (2008).
2. For a history of land dispossession in South Africa see LEONARD THOMPSON, THE
HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA (3d ed. 2001). All references to "property" in this Article refer to
real property and not other forms of property such as cash, securities, or intangible property.
Property is stolen or dispossessed when certain persons or communities are systematically
deprived of property with no just compensation and this leads to a generalized belief in society
that most owners would not own their property today but for these uncompensated takings, see
infra Section II.
3. The Communist regime took property from the elites and redistributed it to peasants
in Nicaragua, Hungary, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. Europeans took property away from
natives and gave it to settlers in the US, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Namibia, and Zim-
babwe. During World War 11, the Nazi regime took property from Jews in Hungary and
Germany. The Israelis took property from the Palestinians during the Arab-Israeli war. Serbs
and Albanians took property from each other during the Kosovo war. See, e.g., Nicolas J.
Gutierrez, Jr., Righting Old Wrongs: A Survey of Restitution Schemes for Possible Application
to a Democratic Cuba, 4 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L. 111, 133-42 (1995) (discussing historical
dispossession of property by the Soviet regime in the Baltic Republics, Germany, Hungary,
and Nicaragua, as well as possible restitution schemes); Ruth Hall, A Comparative Analysis of
Land Rejorm in South Africa and Zimbabwe, in UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE LAND CRISIS IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA 255, 261-64 (Margaret C. Lee & Karen Colvard eds., 2003); Jeremy Wal-
dron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4 (1992) ("The history of white settlers'
dealings with the aboriginal peoples of Australia, New Zealand, and North America is largely
a history of injustice. People, or whole peoples, were attacked, defrauded, and expropriated;
their lands were stolen and their lives were ruined."); Mark Blacksell & Karl Martin Born,
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interestingly, in a subset of these countries, past property dispossession
has greatly contributed to present-day inequality and has become a po-
litically explosive issue that can cause backlash.4 Backlash is a violent,
collective reaction to a social, political, or economic development or
event.' In this Article, I explore the issue of backlash in the context of
Southern Africa.
To sow the poisonous seeds of white rule in South Africa, Zim-
babwe, and Namibia, the colonial and apartheid governments
systematically stripped the African majority of nearly all of their native
land and gave ownership of it to the white minority.6 Consequently, at
independence, whites in Southern Africa owned upwards of eighty per-
cent of the fertile agricultural land although they constituted less than ten
percent of the population . Even though it has been more than fifteen
years since independence, the African majority in Namibia and South
Africa remains landless and impoverished while the affluent white
Private Property Restitution: The Geographical Consequences of Official Government Poli-
cies in Central and Eastern Europe, 168 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 178, 182 (2002) (discussing
property takings by the Nazis in Germany, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania); Eyal
Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the Future Israeli-Palestinian
Settlement, 89 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 295, 297-99 (exploring the private property aspect of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the historical background leading to the displacement of Pales-
tinian refugees); Bernadette Atuahene, Things Fall Apart. The Illegitimacy of Property Rights
in the Context of Past Property Theft, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 849 & n.87 (2009) (citing
UNMIK Reg. No. 2000/60, 2.2, UNMIK/REG/200/60 (Oct. 31, 2000), available at http://
www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/re2000-60.htm).
4. Atuahene, supra note 3, at 838-41, 836 n.28.
5. See id. at 838-41 (establishing the link between inequality and property-related
disobedience).
6. For a history of land dispossession in Southern Africa, see NIGEL WORDEN, THE
MAKING OF MODERN SOUTH AFRICA 6-37 (3d ed. 2000). See also ERIKA VON WIETERSHEIM,
THIS LAND is My LAND! MOTIONS AND EMOTIONS AROUND LAND REFORM IN NAMIBIA 47-
48 (2008); Neil H. Thomas, Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 24 THIRD WORLD Q. 691, 700-02
(2003) (discussing the redistribution of land under President Mugabe); CRAIG RICHARDSON,
THE COLLAPSE OF ZIMBABWE IN THE WAKE OF THE 2000-2003 LAND REFORMS (2004).
7. See Johan van Tooyen & Bongiwe Njobe-Mbuli, Access to Land: Selecting the
Beneficiaries, in AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA: POLICIES, MARKETS AND
MECHANISMS 461, 461 (J. van Zyl et al. eds., 1996) ("Land distribution in South Africa is
highly skewed. Approximately 87 per cent of agricultural land is held by almost 67,000 white
farmers and accommodates a total population of 5.3 million. The remaining 71 per cent of the
population, which is predominantly black, live on 13 per cent of the land in high density ar-
eas-the former homelands."). The same is true in Namibia and it was true in Zimbabwe prior
to the tumultuous land reform program in 2002. See JS Juana, A Quantitative Analysis of Zim-
babwe's Land Reform Policy: An Application of Zimbabwe SAM Multipliers, 45 AGREKON
294, 294 (2006) ("During the colonial era, land was distributed on racial lines, with approxi-
mately 4,660 large-scale predominantly white commercial farmers owning about 14.8 million
hectares and about 6 million black smallholder farmers owning about 16.4 million hectares in
mainly low agricultural potential areas."); Uazuva Kaumbi, Namibia: The Land is Ours!, 426
NEW AFR. 28, 28 (2004) ("[L]ess than 10% of the people own more than 80% of the commer-
cial farmland as a result of colonial theft[.]").
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minority still owns the majority of the land.8 Consequently, there is a
deep discontent that has been taking root among the African majority. If
past property theft is not addressed in a timely fashion, the possibility of
severe backlash is high. The world has already witnessed this possibility
realized in Zimbabwe.9
Countries like those in Southern Africa will never emerge from the
indomitable shadow of inequity and the serious threat of backlash unless
real property is redistributed; but, the conception of property these coun-
tries explicitly or implicitly adopt can adversely affect their ability to
redistribute. Under the classical conception of real property (the classical
conception), redistribution is difficult because title deed holders are a
privileged group who are given nearly absolute property protection. '°
Strangely, the classical conception is ascendant in many transitional
states where redistribution is essential.' The specific question this Arti-
cle addresses is: for states where past property dispossession has the
serious potential to cause backlash and destabilize the current state, is
the classical conception appropriate or do these states require an alterna-
tive conception of property? This Article is an attempt to map out a
transformative conception of real property (the transformative concep-
tion) that facilitates property redistribution, which bolsters fairness and
stability.
The research question I explore is concerned exclusively with states
where past property dispossession has the potential to cause backlash
and destabilize the current state. Nevertheless, on moral grounds, past
theft should be remediated even if there is no threat of backlash. In real-
ity, remediation often does not occur, however, because those with an
interest in maintaining the current property distribution are at odds with
those with an interest in transforming it. But, when the failure to address
past theft through property redistribution can cause serious backlash, this
creates a unique moment of interest convergence, where opponents and
supporters of redistribution are most likely to work together to pursue a
common goal-stability.1
2
8. See DEP'T OF LAND AFF. ANN. REP. 1 APRIL 2006-31 MARCH 2007 9 (2007) (S.
Afr.) (acknowledging that the South African Department of Land Affairs had distributed only
4.3% of the target, which was to transfer 30% of white-owned agricultural land by 2014);
SIDNEY L. HARRING & WILLEM ODENDAAL, "No RESETTLEMENT AVAILABLE": AN AsSESS-
MENT OF THE EXPROPRIATION PRINCIPLE AND ITS IMPACT ON LAND REFORM IN NAMIBIA 29
(2007)(explaining that the Namibian government had exercised its expropriation powers only
eight times since 2004).
9. For more about Zimbabwe's fast track program, see RICHARDSON, supra note 6;
Thomas, supra note 6, at 700-02.
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See infra Part II.CI.
12. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
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A. Literature Review
Although the research question this Article explores has a great deal
of theoretical and practical importance, legal scholars have not directly
addressed it. There is, for example, a substantial legal literature that ex-
amines whether it is wise to provide compensation to remediate past
injustices experienced by various minority groups in the United States. 3
The philosophical literature has explored whether compensation for past
wrongs is justified when there is a significant passage of time. 4 There is
an expansive literature that summarizes and critiques specific efforts to
vindicate the rights of dispossessed owners in a range of transitional
states.'5 There are, however, no articles that specifically explore whether
states, where land reform is necessary to avoid backlash, require a dif-
ferent conception of property.
This Article builds upon the legal literature about backlash created
by Mark Roe, Amy Chua, and myself. Roe argues that, when economic-
based political turmoil is likely, scholars must rethink the emphasis that
law and economics places on analyzing the productive efficiency of a
rule or institution.16 He observes that:
13. See, e.g., ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., CIVIL LIBERTIES, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND
THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT: RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (2001); William Bradford, Beyond Reparations: An Amer-
ican Indian Theory of Justice, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 52-69 (2005); Emma Coleman Jordan, The
Non-Monetary Value of Reparations Rhetoric, 6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 21 (2004) (dis-
cussing the importance of reparations for black Americans and potential challenges to
reparations); Mar J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 388-97 (1987); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Repara-
tions for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2003).
14. See, e.g., Bernard R. Boxill, A Lockean Argument for Black Reparations, 7 J. ETH-
ICS 63, 65-66 (2003) (arguing that the passage of time is irrelevant to whether compensation
for past wrongs is due and that there must be an unbroken causal chain to the detriment of the
present-day group); Waldron, supra note 3, at 15-20 (arguing that previous owner's rights to
property may fade with the passage of time and when the person no longer attaches meaning-
ful expectations to the property by way of autonomy and planning); Jon Elster, On Doing
What One Can, I E. EUR. CONST. REV. 15 (1992) (arguing that compensation after a signifi-
cant passage of time is appropriate only when all guilty parties can be targeted, without
inconsistent punishment).
15. See, e.g., CONFRONTING PAST INJUSTICES: APPROACHES TO AMNESTY, PUNISH-
MENT, REPARATION AND RESTITUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND GERMANY (Medard R.
Rwelamira & Gerhard Werle eds., 1996); RESTITUTION PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (Cornish
et al. eds., 1998); RETURNING HOME: HOUSING AND PROPERTY RESTORATION RIGHTS OF
REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS (Scott Leckie ed., 2003); Ruth Hall, Land Restitution in
South Africa: Rights, Development, and the Restrained State, 38 CAN. J. AFR. STUD. 654
(2004); Istvan Pogany, The Restitution of Former Jewish-Owned Property and Related
Schemes of Compensation in Hungary, 4 EUR. PUB. L. 211 (1998); Michael Heller & Christo-
pher Serkin, Revaluing Restitution: From the Talmud to Postsocialism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1385
(1999); Richard W. Crowder, Comment, Restitution in the Czech Republic: Problems and
Prague-Nosis, 5 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 237 (1994).
16. See Mark Roe, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 239 (1998).
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Voters may see market arrangements as unfair, leading them to
lash back and disrupt otherwise efficient arrangements. To quell
this backlash, inefficient legal structures may arise and survive,
despite the fact that they could not withstand a normal efficiency
critique. The prospect of backlash-or of strategically tempering
otherwise efficient rules and institutions to finesse away a more
destructive backlash-complicates a law and economics in-
quiry.
17
While Roe gives examples of how a state could strategically temper effi-
cient rules or institutions to stave off backlash in the context of
bankruptcy law, 8 I apply his insights to the arena of property law. I de-
velop the transformative conception, which is a mechanism for
strategically tempering efficient rules to facilitate the timely reallocation
of property rights in an effort to promote fairness, avert destructive back-
lash, and increase the property regime's efficiency. 9
Amy Chua picks up on this theme of backlash in her book, World on
Fire, where she examines how the mix of markets, democracy, and eth-
nicity can produce an explosive brand of backlash." She argues:
[m]arkets concentrate wealth, often spectacular wealth, in the
hands of the market-dominant minority, while democracy in-
creases the political power of the impoverished majority. In
these circumstances the pursuit of free market democracy be-
comes an engine of potentially catastrophic ethnonationalism,
pitting a frustrated 'indigenous' majority, easily aroused by op-
portunistic vote-seeking politicians, against a resented, wealthy
ethnic minority."
Chua's analysis is particularly relevant to the land crisis in Southern Af-
rica because most present owners are whites (an ethnically distinct
market-dominant minority) while most dispossessed owners are Africans
17. Id. at 217.
18. Id. at 235-37 (arguing that when political backlash looms large, economically un-
wise but politically astute policies that will abate the backlash can increase overall economic
efficiency).
19. See Leonid Polishchuk, Distribution of Assets and Credibility of Property Rights,
Ctr. for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector and New Econ. School (unpublished
manuscript on file with author) ("[I]f private property rights are not sufficiently broadly rec-
ognized in the society as legitimate and fair, it makes a property rights regime unstable. This
instability precludes efficient relocation of assets, and as a result expected efficiency gains of
private ownership fail to materialize.").
20. See AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY
BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 6-7 (2003) [hereinafter WORLD ON FIRE];
see also Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward A New Paradigm for Law
and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1 (1998).
21. WORLD ON FIRE, supra note 20, at 6-7.
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(an impoverished yet politically empowered majority). I build upon
Chua's work by explaining how strict adherence to the classical concep-
tion can prevent the equitable redistribution of property and ignite
backlash.22 I also move beyond Chua's analysis of the problem to pro-
pose a solution-the transformative conception.
I further added to this important literature about backlash in an arti-
cle entitled, Things Fall Apart: The Illegitimacy of Property Rights in the
Context of Past Theft (Things Fall Apart).23 That article explored the
question: How does a state avoid present-day property-related disobedi-
ence when past property theft causes a significant number of people to
believe that the current property distribution is illegitimate?24 I argued
that the most effective way to do this is to implement a Legitimacy En-
hancing Compensation Program (LECP). The main contribution of
Things Fall Apart was to develop a rational choice model that estab-
lished the process a state should use to decide when to implement a
LECP to avoid backlash.25 This Article builds on my previous work by
developing the transformative conception, which gives the state the legal
framework necessary to expeditiously and efficiently implement a LECP.
B. Developing the Transformative Conception
The transformative conception's central purpose is to strike the cor-
rect balance between defending the property rights of current owners and
defending the property rights of unjustly dispossessed past owners by
facilitating land reform. The state can give current owners varying levels
of property protection. On one side of the spectrum is the classical con-
ception and its call for minimal government intrusion into private
property. But, if the state gives current owners' property rights a certain
sanctity, this makes redistributive measures prohibitively expensive or so
cumbersome that the pace of transfer is dangerously slow. This is illus-
trated by the deep discontent brewing in both Namibia and South Africa
around the torpid pace of land reform because of the state's commitment
to the classical conception and market-led land reform.
26
On the other side of the spectrum is when private property rights
have scant protection across the board or a select group is subject to
22. The willing-seller/willing-buyer principle-also known as negotiated land reform-
is a market-led approach to land reform where the state can only acquire property from willing
sellers and refrains from using its eminent domain power to expropriate land. See discussion
infra Part III.C. 1.
23. See Atuahene, supra note 3.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 851-59 (arguing states should implement a LECP before reaching a legiti-
macy deficit. A legitimacy deficit is when the cost of illegitimacy begins to outweigh the cost
of a LECP).
26. See infra Part II.
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expropriation without compensation. Zimbabwe's chaotic land reform
program in 2000 is a perfect case in point because the state expropriated
white-owned farms without compensation.27 The empirical evidence
clearly demonstrates that expropriation without compensation discour-
ages investment mainly because entrepreneurs cannot reap the fruits of
their investment.28 We need a middle ground between the two extremes
where permissible redistribution does not morph into impermissible con-
fiscation. This is the void the transformative conception attempts to fill
by facilitating land reform while not falling prey to the well documented
perils of nominal property protection.
I begin, in Part II, by giving a brief historical background that ex-
plains why past property theft threatens to destabilize certain states
today. I use Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe as my primary exam-
ples. Once the stage is set, I then move to Part III, where I define the
classical conception's central principles. I provide two illustrations of the
classical conception and explain why it is inadequate when past theft can
lead to backlash. I then turn, in Part IV, to explain the transformative
conception's defining principles. I provide concrete examples of redis-
tributive policies-consistent with the transformative conception but not
with the classical conception-that can facilitate timely land reform. Af-
ter reviewing the potential criticisms of the transformative conception, I
conclude that although it is not perfect, the transformative conception is
a significant improvement over the classical conception for certain states
that decide to address past land dispossession. In Part V, I emphasize the
limitations of the transformative conception. I argue that the transforma-
tive conception is not suitable under all circumstances and when it is
appropriate, I suggest a method for determining its appropriate duration.
Part VI concludes by emphasizing that the transformative conception is
more appropriate than the classical conception in situations where redis-
tribution of real property is essential for promoting justice and stability.
27. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 6, at 700-02.
28. See Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven, Financial Development, Property Rights, and
Growth, 58 J. FIN. 2401 (2003) (finding secure property rights increase a firm's willingness to
allocate resources to property, which in turn leads to overall economic growth); Stein Holden
& Hailu Yohannes, Land Redistribution, Tenure Insecurity, and Intensity of Production: A
Study of Farm Households in Southern Ethiopia, 78 LAND EcON. 573, 574-75 (2002) (de-
scribing observed relationships between willingness of landowners to make long-term
improvements and tenure insecurity based on inconsistent land reform efforts in Ethiopia).
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II. PAST PROPERTY THEFT CAN DESTABILIZE
THE CURRENT STATE: THE CASE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
In this section, I give a brief history of Southern Africa to demon-
strate why land theft, which occurred centuries or decades ago, still
deeply embitters the African majority and has great potential to cause
backlash. Although I focus on the Southern African case, there are other
nations, such as Nicaragua and Kosovo, where the past confiscation of
property could also potentially lead to backlash.
Property is stolen or dispossessed when certain persons or communi-
ties are systematically deprived of property with no just compensation
and this leads to a generalized belief in society that most owners would
not own their property today but for these uncompensated takings 9 Un-
der these circumstances, the population is likely to perceive the existing
property distribution as illegitimate and this perception can serve as the
basis for property disobedience and backlash. This definition is narrow
and meant to cover only the cases in which past theft can significantly
contribute to present-day backlash. It is not meant to diminish the impor-
tance of other instances where there were morally wrong takings of
property that do not jeopardize current stability.
For example, this Article's definition of stolen or dispossessed prop-
erty includes countries similarly situated to Southern Africa, but it does
not cover countries like the US. This is because although the US gov-
ernment usurped land from Native Americans during Conquest, there is
no generalized belief that I, for example, would not own my home in
Chicago today but for past theft. For the majority of Americans, land
usurped from Native Americans is a sordid but closed chapter in our
country's history. Consequently, it is not currently a politically destabi-
lizing issue. In contrast, in Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe there
is a generalized belief that present owners would not own their property
today if not for the systematic confiscation of property in the past. °
Moreover, past property theft can potentially destabilize these nations
because it plays a prominent role in the present collective memory, the
connection between current inequality and past theft is pronounced, the
majority group was dispossessed by the minority group, and the state has
a weak capacity or willingness to prevent or subdue destructive backlash.
29. See supra note 2.
30. See, e.g., JAMES L. GIBSON, OVERCOMING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES: LAND RECON-
CILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 46 (2009) ( "Among black South Africans, the most widely
accepted factor accounting for land inequality is the advantages whites still hold as a result of
the apartheid past: 77% of blacks consider this to be either an important or very important
cause of land injustice. Coloured people hold similar views (80%), as do those of Asian origin
(63%). Whites, as usual, are the exception: Only 34% attribute land inequality to the apartheid
past.").
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In Southern Africa, the issue of past property theft is a time bomb
waiting to explode. Uazuva Kaumbi, the Namibia Broadcasting Corpora-
tion Board Chairman, captured the mood of his countrymen when he
noted that:
[t]he smoldering land question in Namibia will burst into a bon-
fire unless and until answers are provided to the satisfaction of
the indigenous people who are historically the real owners of the
land. Land is the most important means of production, and with-
out an equitable restoration to its real owners, independence will
remain a mere paper tiger.''3
Past property theft has the potential to cause backlash and potentially
destabilize the Namibian state.
Similarly, a study done by James Gibson concludes that past theft
has the potential to cause backlash and destabilize South Africa.32 In one
of the most ambitious and impressive public opinion studies done on
land to date, Gibson surveyed 3,700 South Africans and found that eigh-
ty five percent of black respondents believe that "[m]ost land in South
Africa was taken unfairly by white settlers, and they therefore have no
right to the land today."33 In contrast, only eight percent of whites held
the same view.34 His most troubling finding is that two of every three
blacks agreed that "land must be returned to blacks in South Africa, no
matter what the consequences are for the current owners and for political
stability in the country.' 3' Ninety one percent of whites disagreed with
this statement.36 Gibson argues that, in South Africa, "[f]and issues have
all of the characteristics required to become volatile and destabilizing,
should effective political leadership emerge to mobilize the discon-
tented."37
31. See Kaumbi, supra note 7, at 28. See also Henning Melber, Land & Politics in Na-
mibia, 32 REV. AFR. POL. EcON. 135, 141 (2005) ("[T]he land issue might be-as long as it
remains unresolved for a large part of the population-a social factor to be easily activated by
those competing for political power, material gains and seeking popular support."); Justine
Hunter, Interviews on Land Reform in Namibia, in WHO SHOULD OWN THE LAND? ANALYSES
AND VIEWS ON LAND REFORM AND THE LAND QUESTION IN NAMIBIA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
109, 117-21 (interviewing various government officials in Namibia about land reform, who all
agree that land reform is an emotional issue with the potential to create social unrest); WIET-
ERSHEIM, supra note 6, at 54 ("The unequal distribution of land became a symbol for all
injustice-even when similar or even greater injustices happened in other economic sectors-
and in the end the return of land epitomized the return of true independence.").
32. See GIBSON, supra note 30, at 31-32.
33. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. at 31.
35. Id. at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 84.
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In Zimbabwe, the volatile issue of past property theft is one primary
cause of Zimbabwe's present destabilization.3 8 The unjust, colonial land
distribution that gave whites ownership of upwards of eighty percent of
the fertile agricultural land was a source of deep resentment and frustra-
tion for Africans. After Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe's president since its
independence, led several unsuccessful attempts to fundamentally trans-
form the property distribution, Africans in Zimbabwe (especially
veterans of the independence movement) became increasingly unwilling
39to countenance the injustice any longer. In a desperate attempt to rap-
idly deliver on the promise of land reform and retain power, Mugabe's
government supported a hasty and violent land reform program in
2000.40 Although the reform program redistributed eighty percent of
commercial farmland from whites to blacks, it is not clear which blacks
benefited 4-those with ties to Mugabe's political party or those in need
of land 2
Mugabe's program did make landownership more equitable; but, be-
cause it was implemented in a chaotic, violent manner, this came at an
enormous cost.43 By 2005, agricultural output, which is the mainstay of
the economy, declined by thirty percent. The number of large, fully op-
erational farms plummeted from 3217 to 250 partially operational
farms." The average annual rate of Zimbabwe's gross domestic product
(GDP) growth from 2000 to 2006 was negative 5.6%, whereas in the
preceding seven years (1993-1999) there was positive growth of 3.3%.4
After Mugabe implemented his violent brand of land reform, inflation
has been rampant and reached its peak of 500,000,000,000% in late
2008, before the government abandoned the Zimbabwean Dollar in favor
38. Thomas, supra note 6, at 694-95.
39. Id. at 700.
40. Id. at 700-02.
41. See Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], Zimbabwe: Selected Issues and Statistical Appen-
dix, 14-17, Country Rep. No. 05/359 (Oct. 2005) (prepared by Sharmini Coorey et al.).
42. The lack of transparency has made it difficult to determine who is presently resid-
ing on confiscated farms and thus who benefited from the land reform. See id. 23.
43. Samantha Power, How To Kill A Country, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 2003, http://
www.theatlantic.comlmagazine/archive/2003/12/how-to-kill-a-country/2845/ (detailing Zim-
babwe's economic decline and characterizing Mugabe's fast-track program as a "violent,
country-wide land grab"); Heather Boyle, The Land Problem: What Does the Future Hold for
South Africa's Land Reform Program?, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 665, 666 (2001) ("In
neighboring Zimbabwe, widespread violence, rampant theft, and farm invasions plague Zim-
babwe's land reform program.").
44. IMF, supra note 41, 16.
45. U.N. Stat. Div., GDP Annual Rate of Growth (World Bank Estimates),
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/databases.htm (search for "Zimbabwe GDP growth"; follow "GDP
annual rate of growth (World Bank estimates)" hyperlink) (last visited Jul. 5, 2010) (showing
Zimbabwe's annual GDP growth percentages from 1961 to 2006).
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of a multi-currency system.46 Today, Zimbabwe, a once great nation, has
deteriorated to the point where shortages of basic goods are common-
place.47
Zimbabwe has provided the international community with an evoca-
tive portrait of how the failure to successfully address past property theft
can lead to backlash and destabilize a state. The African majorities in
South Africa and Namibia are also becoming dangerously impatient and
if swift action is not taken to redistribute land, these countries may go
the way of Zimbabwe. The following subsection explains how the region
of Southern Africa came to this point.
A. The History of Property Theft in Southern Africa
During the pre-colonial period in Namibia, South Africa, and Zim-
babwe, Africans used land in a variety of ways. Some ethnic groups
were stationary, cultivated the land and raised livestock while others
were nomadic pastoralists or hunters and gatherers.46 In contrast to the
European model of land ownership, in Southern Africa, those that culti-
vated land usually relied upon a chief or elder to assign land use rights
according to need."
Upon the arrival of Europeans, however, the status quo of property
ownership in Southern Africa changed dramatically. The colonial pow-
ers-the British, the Germans, and the Dutch-used violence to
systematically expropriate innumerable acres of land, without consent or
just compensation, in violation of indigenous peoples' most basic human
46. Public Information Notice No. 09/53, IMF, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2009
Article IV Consultation with Zimbabwe (May 6, 2009), http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/
pn/2009/pn0953.htm (noting hyperinflation reached its peak in 2008 at 500 billion percent and
the financial outlook remains precarious.). For a technical evaluation of Zimbabwe's Inflation,
see Steve H. Hanke & Alex K. F. Kwok, On the Measurement of Zimbabwe's Hyperinflation,
CATO J. 353, 355 (2009) (estimating Zimbabwe's annual inflation rate, as of November 14,
2008, was 89,700,000,000,000,000,000,000%, much higher than the IMF Executive Board's
estimate).
47. See IMF, Zimbabwe: 2005 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report; Public Informa-
tion Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Authorities of
Zimbabwe, AT 4, Country Rep. No. 05/360 (Oct. 2005); WIETERSHEIM, supra note 6, at 83
("In Zimbabwe more than 4,000 (80%) of white farmers have left or were chased off their
farms. Commercial farming has largely broken down, and more than 200 000 former farm
workers are now both landless and jobless. Three million Zimbabweans have left their coun-
try, the inflation rate is the highest in the world, unemployment is around 80%, and almost 6
million citizens depend on food aid.").
48. Leonard Thompson, supra note 2, at 6-12 (describing the various modes of produc-
tion in pre-colonial southern Africa, including hunter-gatherers, pastoralists, etc.);
WIETERSHEIM, supra note 6, at 141 ("Traditionally, black Namibians have practiced communal
ownership of land. Land belonged to the community and was allocated and administered by
traditional chiefs. Farmers were allowed to use a piece of land assigned to them in a culturally
accepted way, but it would always remain under the chief's authority and control.").
49. WIETERSHEIM, supra note 6, at 141.
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rights. Land was not only stolen to provide white settlers with farms, but
it was also taken to destroy African self-sufficiency and create a surplus
of cheap labor to work on white-owned farms and mines.0 As a conse-
quence of this, today upwards of eighty percent of commercial farmland
in the region is owned by whites, who constitute less than ten percent of
the population.5 Depriving Africans of their property was essential to
their domination; consequently, many Africans believe that liberation
will not be complete until the land comes back to Africans who are (in
their view) its rightful owners. 2 This is why the return of stolen land was
one of the most powerful motivating factors of the region's independ-
ence movements. 3
In all three countries, independence involved a negotiated settlement
between Africans and their former oppressors. In exchange for political
independence, the African liberation parties agreed to allow present
owners to keep their property and maintain their jobs despite past injus-
tice.54 This meant that if, for example, a white family received a surplus
of land free of charge from the apartheid or colonial government-which
took it from an African community without consent and without paying
just compensation-upon independence, the family's legal ownership of
that land was solidified.55 If the democratic government wanted to expro-
priate the property from the white family and return it to the African
community that owned it originally, then the government had to pay just
compensation. 6
In this bargain, the white minority secured valid legal title to sub-
stantial assets while dispossessed African communities received a
promise of land reform. For South Africa and Namibia, this promise has
been elusive because the majority of Africans have yet to receive land or
50. See Alois Mlambo, The Ambiguities of Independence, Zimbabwe 1980-1990, in
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE LAND CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 3, at 64.
51. See sources, supra note 7.
52. WIETERSHEIM, supra note 6, at 52-53; RICHARDSON, supra note 6; GIBSON, supra
note 30.
53. Id.
54. See Margaret Lee, The Rise and Decline of the Settler Regimes of South Africa,
Namibia, and Zimbabwe, in UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE LAND CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA,
supra note 3, at 1.
55. Section 25.1 of the South African Constitution ensures that all property owners are
protected regardless of how they acquired the property. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 25.1. European
colonizers most often took land from African communities and not individuals. See e.g.
Adrien Wing, Communitarianism v. Individualism: Constitutionalism in Namibia and
South Africa, 11 WIs. INT'L L.J. 295, 299 (1992-1993) (emphasizing the importance of
communitarianism in both South Africa and Namibia).
56. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, §§ 25.2, 25.3.
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other equitable compensation for past theft 7 Consequently, some critics
argue that since land reform is moving so slowly, the bargain is illegiti-
mate. Thus, whites who acquired land under dubious circumstances have
no legitimate right to it and should relinquish title without the payment
of just compensation. 8 But, although only one side of the liberation bar-
gain has been upheld, the governments of Namibia and South Africa
have honored the bargain and thereby ensured its legitimacy. '9 This is the
current reality. Consequently, the starting point for the analysis in this
Article is the assumption that present owners have valid legal title to
their land and that land reform is imperative.
B. The Case for Land Reform in Southern Africa
The objective of land reform, as defined in this Article, is to secure
greater access to land for those individuals and groups who were un-
justly dispossessed of land or robbed of the opportunity to acquire land
in the first place. Without land reform, the unwieldy vines of past prop-
erty theft will strangle justice and the indelible ink of Colonialism and
Apartheid will forever stain the emergent democracies of Southern Af-
rica. In addition to facilitating justice and successful democracies in
Southern Africa, land reform is also vital because Africans are in dire
need of land. For example, in Namibia, although land is scarce, seventy
percent of the population is dependent upon agriculture for their suste-
nance. Likewise, prior to the chaotic land reform in 2000, Zimbabwe's
economy was primarily agrarian and about seventy percent of its popula-
57. See Wietersheim, supra note 6, at 43 (arguing that in Namibia, only about 17% of
formerly white land is now settled by blacks). See also supra note 7 and accompanying text;
supra note 8; infra note 64.
58. See, e.g., Wolfgang Werner, Land Reform in Namibia: The First Seven Years 1, 8-9
(Namibian Econ. Policy Res. Unit [NEPRU], Working Paper No. 61, 1997) (noting that, based
on the assumption commercial farmers in Namibia had stolen the land from indigenous farm-
ers, "[p]oliticians from the ruling and opposition parties argued that to buy back commercial
farm land was 'immoral and illegal."').
59. Zimbabwe honored the liberation bargain from independence in 1980 until the
chaotic land reform program in 2000. See generally Norma Kriger, Liberation from Constitu-
tional Constraints: Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 27 SAIS REVIEW 63 (2007) (detailing
Zimbabwe's initial policy of paying just compensation to white farmers and the constitutional
restraints that were removed by Mugabe in 2000 to circumvent that policy).
60. See id.; Mmantsetsa Toka Marope, Namibia Human Capital and Knowledge Devel-
opment for Economic Growth with Equity 5 (World Bank, Afr. Region Human Dev., Working
Paper No. 84, 2005); Phanuel Kaapama, Commercial Land Reforms in Postcolonial Namibia:
What Happened to Liberation Struggle Rhetoric?, in TRANSITION IN NAMIBIA: WHICH
CHANGES FOR WHOM? 29 (Melber Henning ed., 2007) ("Although the country has a very low
population density, most of this land mass comprises semi-arid rangeland, with low rates of
rainfall and infertile soils, making it unsuitable for large-scale agricultural production. This
has created a condition of land scarcity that has over the years remained a source of social
tension and indirectly a potential source of violent political conflict.").
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tion resided in the countryside." There is a serious need for land in South
Africa as well because although only four percent of its GDP is based on
agriculture, half of its population resides in rural areas.62
Two World Bank economists, Deiniger and Feder, convincingly ar-
gue that access to land is vitally important. They state that:
[i]n agrarian societies land is not only the main means for gener-
ating livelihood but often also to accumulate wealth and transfer
it between generations. The way in which land rights are as-
signed therefore determines households' ability to produce their
subsistence and generate marketable surplus, their social and
economic status (and in many cases their collective identity),
their incentive to exert non-observable effort and make invest-
ments, and often also their ability to access financial markets or
to arrange for smoothing of consumption and income.63
Despite the importance of land, the region's land reform programs have
64
slumbered along for at least ten or more years after independence.
Government failure to deliver on the promise of land reform has already
had disastrous consequences in Zimbabwe and has the potential to wreak
havoc in Namibia and South Africa. This Article tries to uncover and
address the legal obstacles to implementing efficient and effective land
reform programs.
61. See Ruth Hall, A Comparative Analysis of Land Reform in South Africa and Zim-
babwe in UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE LAND CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 3, at
261; U.N. Stat. Div., Population by Sex and Urban/Rural Residence, http://unstats.un.org/
unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2002.htm (search for "Zimbabwe urban/rural 2002";
follow "Population by sex and urban/rural residence" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 24, 2010)
(showing over 65% of Zimbabweans living in rural areas in 2002).
62. See Ruth Hall, supra note 61, at 258, 261.
63. Klaus Deininger & Gershon Feder, Land Institutions and Land Markets 1 (World
Bank, Dev. Res. Group, Working Paper No. 2014, 1998).
64. In Zimbabwe, for example, the government had "acquired only 3 million hectares
of land, 44% of which was in the dry and infertile Natural Regions IV and V, while only 5% of
the peasant farmers in the communal areas had been resettled." Mlambo, supra note 50, at 65,
70. Likewise, the distribution of land under Namibia's land reform program has been slow in
its implementation:
[U]ntil July 2007, 349 full-time farmers and 274 part-time farmers had bought
farms through the Affirmative Action Loan Scheme. In addition, about 180 blacks
have purchased commercial farms on the open market without participating in a
state loan scheme. 40 commercial farms were in black hands even before independ-
ence. This means that about 14%, or one out of seven commercial farms (843 out of
6,000), is today in the private ownership of black Namibians.
WIETERSHEIM, supra note 6, at 33-36.
65. There is a vast literature confirming that land reform can increase economic growth
and decrease the potential for instability. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL
ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 378-80 (1968) (observing that land reform has a stabilizing
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C. Beyond Southern Africa: A Global Perspective
Although I focus on Southern Africa, there are also several other na-
tions where contested land rights could potentially lead to backlash. In
Nicaragua, for example, the left-leaning Frente Sandinista de Liberacion
Nacional (the Sandinistas) wrested power from the infamously corrupt
Somoza regime. The Sandanistas implemented massive agrarian land
reform that transferred land from Somoza loyalists and large landowners
to poor peasants.66 Upon the defeat of the Sandanistas in 1990, Chamorro
and her newly elected administration recognized that the ownership of
many land parcels was contested; and that if the claims of both present
and past owners were not swiftly addressed, this had the potential to up-
end Nicaragua's nascent democracy." Despite this, Chamorro and
effect on the political system and increases agricultural productivity in the long run); RUSSELL
KING, LAND REFORM: A WORLD SURVEY (1977); Roy L. PROSTERMAN & JEFFREY M. RIED-
INGER, LAND REFORM AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT (1987); Daron Acemoglu, et al., The
Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON.
REV. 1369 (2001); Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, Land Reform Poverty Reduction and
Growth: Evidence from India, 115 Q. J. OF ECON. 389 (2000) (arguing land reforms in India
were associated with poverty reduction); Klaus Deininger & Lyn Squire, New Ways of Looking
at Old Issues: Inequality and Growth, 57 J. DEV. ECON. 259 (1998); Edmundo Flores, Issues
of Land Reform, 78 J. POL. ECON. 890 (1970); Herschel I. Grossman, Production, Appropria-
tion, and Land Reform, 84 AM. EcON. REV. 705 (1994) (determining that land reform can
benefit landlords); T. David Mason, Take Two Acres and Call Me in the Morning: Is Land
Reform a Prescription for Peasant Unrest?, 60 J. POL. 199 (1998); Karl 0. Moene, Poverty
and Landownership 82 AM. ECON. REV. 52 (1992) (concluding that land reform's effective-
ness depends on the availability of fertile land); Edward N. Muller et al., Land Inequality and
Political Violence, 83 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 577 (1989); Klaus Deininger & Pedro Olinto, Asset
Distribution, Inequality, and Growth (World Bank, Dev. Res. Group, Working Paper No. 2375,
2000) (arguing that land inequality has a negative impact on economic growth); Klaus Dein-
inger, Songqing Jin & Hari K. Nagarajan, Land Reforms, Poverty Reduction, and Economic
Growth: Evidence from India (World Bank, Dev. Res. Group, Working Paper No. 4448, 2007);
Klaus Deninger & Songqing Jin, Land Rental Markets as an Alternative to Government Real-
location?: Equity and Efficiency Considerations in the Chinese Land Tenure System (World
Bank, Dev. Res. Group, Working Paper No. 2930, 2002); KLAUS DEININGER ET AL., How
LAND REFORM CAN CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION: EM-
PIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL AND ZIMBABWEAN EXPERIENCE 1 (2000),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/825826-1111148606850/20431879/
Zimbabwe.pdf.
66. See Michael Roche, Competing Claims: The Struggle for Title in Nicaragua, 39
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 577 (2006).
67. See Deena I. Abu-Lughod, Failed Buyout: Land Rights for Contra Veterans in
Postwar Nicaragua, 27 LATIN AM. PERSPECTIVES 32 (2000) (discussing hastily and poorly
executed land reform efforts intended to prevent unrest); Mark Everingham, Agricultural
Property Rights and Political Change in Nicaragua, 43 LATIN AM. POL. & Soc'Y 61 (2001)
(discussing volatile property right issues as a threat to emerging democracies, using Nicaragua
as an example).
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subsequent regimes have failed to address the claims of past owners,.... 68
making backlash and state destabilization a tangible possibility.
Kosovo is another example. Prior to the NATO bombing in 1999,
thousands of Kosovo Albanians were forced to flee hastily and leave
69their property behind due to a Serbian-led ethnic cleansing campaign.
When the Kosovo war ended, the interim UN-led civilian administration
(the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)) recognized that the
failure to resolve contested property rights could undermine the peace
process and lead to serious backlash. 0 Consequently, the arguments I
make in this Article likely apply beyond Southern Africa.
In sum, prior to independence, the Southern African liberation par-
ties struck a deal with the white power structure. In exchange for
political freedom, the liberation parties agreed that whites could main-
tain their property despite its provenance.' But, there was one major
proviso-the state had to vindicate the property rights of the
68. See Anja Nygren, Competing Claims on Disputed Lands: The Complexity of
Resource Tenure in the Nicaraguan Interior, 39 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 123, 132-35 (2004)
(describing the land reform policies of Nicaraguan leadership following the Sandinista
defeat); David R. Dye et al., Contesting Everything, Winning Nothing: The Search for Con-
sensus in Nicaragua, 1990-1995 (Hemisphere Initiatives, Brookline, MA) Nov. 1995,
available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/hemisphereinitiatives/contesting.htm (noting the
inability of the Chamorro government to address land reform issues adequately and the
resulting land invasions and discord).
69. See Leopold von Carlowitz, Resolution of Property Disputes in Bosnia and Kosovo:
The Contribution to Peacebuilding, 12 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 547, 551 (2005) (noting that of
the estimated 860,000 Kosovo Albanians who fled or were removed during the conflict, the
majority returned to find that approximately 50% of the housing was destroyed during the
conflict). Hans Das, Restoring Property Rights in the Aftermath of War, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.
Q. 429, 430-33 (2004) (noting that, by the end of the conflict, approximately 800,000 nation-
als had fled or been driven out of Kosovo).
70. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) decided
to defend the rights of past owners by passing a law that states any person who was dispos-
sessed of a property right between March 23, 1989 and March 24, 1999 as a result of
discrimination has a right to restitution in kind or compensation. UNMIK, On Residential
Property Claims and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Housing and Property Direc-
torate and the Housing and Property Claims Commission, § 2.2, UNMIK/REG/2000/60 (Oct.
31, 2000). See also Leopold von Carlowitz, Crossing the Boundary from the International to
the Domestic Legal Realm: UNMIK Lawmaking and Property Rights in Kosovo, 10 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 307, 307 (2004) (acknowledging that it is too early to judge how successful
UNMIK's land reform policies have been; however, arguing that "resolution of property issues
is often pivotal for the success of a peace building process in a post conflict situation").
71. See RICHARD SPITZ & MATTHEW CHASKALSON, THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION: A
HIDDEN HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT 312, 317 (2000) (noting that
the interim Constitution reflected a compromise between the two positions); Matthew
Chaskalson, Stumbling Towards Section 28: Negotiations over the Protection of Property
Rights in the Interim Constitution, 11 S. AFR. J. HuM. RTS. 222, 229-38 (1995) (providing an
insider's view of the pre-liberation negotiation that led to the constitutional property clause,
which protected existing property rights); A.J. Van Der Walt, The Constitutional Property
Clause: Striking a Balance Between Guarantee and Limitation, in PROPERTY AND THE CON-
STITUTION 109, 111-12 (Janet McLean ed., 1999).
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dispossessed African majority through land reform.2 In the end, whites
kept their land and Africans never received theirs. It should therefore
come as no surprise that the cheated African majority is now overcome
with anger.73 Consequently, past property theft has the potential to cause
backlash and destabilize the South African and Namibian states, as we
have already seen in Zimbabwe. Although I focus on Southern Africa in
this section, the reallocation of property rights is necessary to secure
peace in other nations as well.
4
III. THE CLASSICAL CONCEPTION
In this section, Part A outlines the classical conception's origins and
its defining principles. To paint a more lucid picture of the classical con-
ception, Part B provides two contemporary manifestations of it: the
implementation of the South African constitution's land restitution pro-
vision and the implementation of the South African constitution's
eminent domain provision. After providing a comprehensive description
of the classical conception, Part C offers a critique of it, where I explain
the weaknesses of the classical conception. 5 I also argue that the justifi-
cations for the classical conception fall short when systematic past
property theft places the legitimacy of property rights in question.
A. The Classical Conception Defined
The classical conception is often associated with Blackstone who
famously defined property as, "that sole and despotic dominion which
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in
,,7"
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.
Blackstone's definition has become a trope for the belief that property is
unified (rather than a bundle of rights) and that an owner rightly has near
72. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 25(7). See also HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOC-
RACY: LAW, GLOBALISM, AND SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 85-92 (2000)
(describing the strategies used to confront historical injustice in the constitution).
73. See generally Kaumbi, supra note 7; Gibson, supra note 30.
74. See Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, A Theory of Political Transitions, 91
AM. ECON. REV. 938 (2001) (finding that high levels of inequality between groups in society
leads to political instability); Jamie Crook, Promoting Peace and Economic Security in Rwan-
da Through Fair and Equitable Land Rights, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1487, 1490 (2006) (arguing that
the Rwandan government must further promote equitable land access through land reform in
order to create peace and stability); Ruth Hall, A Political Economy of Land Reform in South
Africa, 31 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 213, 214 (2004) (noting that the World Bank advised that
redistributing the land in South Africa was necessary to avert social and political instability).
75. For more information on negotiated land reform, see infra Part III.B.2.
76. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
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absolute power to control his property.77 However, it is clear that Black-
stone's absolutist and individualist definition was merely a starting point
from which he introduced limiting provisions. 8 In reality, the genesis of
the classical conception predates Blackstone, arising in feudal times
when a land lord had full control over his land. Land lords had sover-
eignty over the land that included the power to govern, nominate priests,
exact military service, levy taxes, pass legislation, and establish courts.79
Today, the classical conception is still predicated upon significant
owner control. Singer argues that "[t]he classical conception focuses on
the concepts of title and ownership and presumes full control of specific
valued resources by the 'owner' backed up by state power. This concep-
tion remains powerful and exerts substantial determinative force in
adjudicating and developing the rules of property law."8 As a practical
matter, Singer's argument that the classical conception gives owners full
control of their property is a slight overstatement."' The following four
principles are a more accurate description of the classical conception.
Under the classical conception, an owner must:
1. acquire valid legal title through individual efforts to become
the sole owner with consolidated rights;
2. possess near absolute control over the use and transfer of her
property so long as it does not cause significant harm to any-
one else;
3. rely upon the state to defend her rights against third parties
who attempt to infringe upon this control while deemphasiz-
ing her duties to third parties; and,
77. Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J.
601, 603-04(1998); David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETI-
CAL INQUIRIES L. 103, 104-07 (2009).
78. See Rose, supra note 77, at 603-04; Schorr, supra note 77, at 104-07. See also
Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 22 (1927) (pointing out that
"[1]awyers occupied with civil or private law have in any case continued the absolutistic con-
vention of property; and in doing this, they are faithful to the language of the great 18th
century codes, the French, Prussian, and Austrian, and even the 19th century codes like the
Italian and German which also begin with a definition of property as absolute or unlimited
though they subsequently introduce qualifying or limiting provisions"); Marshall Harris, Legal
Aspects of Land Tenure, 23 J. FARM EcON. 173, 176-80 (1941) (providing a very brief history
of the classical conception of property from the Roman period to the early English classical
school).
79. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 259-61 (3d ed.
1990).
80. Joseph William Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement, in
PROPERTY LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 69, 70 (G.E. van Maanen & A.J.
van der Walt eds., 1996).
81. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 78, at 176-80.
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4. expect that the state or other third parties will bear the burden
of justifying any actions that attenuate her control of the prop-
erty.12
B. The Classical Conception Applied
1. The Implementation of the South African Constitution's
Land Restitution Provision
South Africa's implementation of its constitution's land restitution
provision is a prime example of the classical conception at work. The
South African government has a three-prong land reform strategy that
includes land tenure reform, land redistribution, and land restitution.
Land tenure reform is intended to secure tenure by transforming infor-
mal property rights into more formal rights. Land redistribution gives
formerly disadvantaged individuals an opportunity to own land regard-
less of what they may have owned or possessed in the past. Land
restitution compensates individuals and communities whose land was
expropriated by past governments. According to Section 25.7 of the
South African constitution, "a person or community dispossessed of
property after June 19, 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory
laws or practices" is entitled to land restitution or redress."
There are many problems with the government's implementation of
the constitutional land restitution provision.84 One of the most troubling
is the amount of financial compensation that the government has paid
individuals and communities who did not opt for restitution of their
land.85 Due to financial constraints, the compensation paid was merely
82. In 1990 when the post-apartheid Namibian state was established, the court solidi-
fied the nation's commitment to the classical conception. In the landmark case of De Roeck v.
Campbell & Others the court ruled that, "ownership includes the right to possess one's prop-
erty, to dispose of it and even destroy it. If anyone else lays claim to such property or to
interfere with any one of those rights, the onus is on such person to justify his claim." See De
Roeck v. Campbell & Others, (1) 1990 NR 126 (HC) (Namib.). As required by the classical
conception, the Namibian state defends the ownership rights of title deed holders who have
extensive power to control their property; and non-owners bear the burden of proving the
validity of encroachments on owner control.
83. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 25(7). See also Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act
48 of 2003 (S. Afr.) (enabling the means for the right to restitution or redress provided in the
constitution).
84. See generally THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF LAND RESTITUTION: RESTORING
WHAT WAS OURS (Derick Fay & Deborah James eds., 2009); Edward Lahiff, Land Reform in
South Africa: A Status Report 2008, at 2-6 (Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, Re-
search Report No. 28, 2008) (highlighting the progress and concerns regarding land tenure
reform, land distribution, and land restitution in South Africa).
85. See DEP'T OF LAND AFF. ANN. REP. 1 APRIL 2008- 31 MARCH 2009, at 30 (2009)
(S. Afr.).
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symbolic and did not reflect the market value of the property at the time
16of confiscation or at present. For example, the government paid
R40,000 (about $5200) to non-whites who were evicted from valuable
17land they owned in Sophiatown. The government claims that the reason
the amounts it paid were so small is because it lacks the resources to pay
market-related prices." But, if the government uses eminent domain to
purchase land from whites who now live in Sophiatown for redistribution
to dispossessed populations, then despite its budget constraints, the gov-
ernment pays market value. 9
The government gives current owners market compensation while
past owners who were unjustly dispossessed receive symbolic compen-
sation because the government is giving existing owners' rights more
value than the rights of dispossessed individuals and communities. This
is because the state is working within a conceptual framework that as-
sumes current owners acquired valid legal title through their individual
effort to become the exclusive, deserving owners. The framework as-
sumes that since you worked hard to acquire and develop the property,
then you are entitled to the full market value of the property upon expro-
priation. The framework dismisses the possibility that current owners
acquired their property unjustly; and it also ignores the rights of owners
unjustly dispossessed. Most importantly, the framework overlooks the
duties present owners may have to dispossessed populations with valid
ownership claims. Thus, despite the transformative potential of Section
25.7, the classical conception is the framework that has informed the
government's decisions and determined the outcomes.
2. The Implementation of the South African Constitution's
Eminent Domain Provision
Negotiated land reform-also known as the willing-seller/willing-
buyer principle-is a market-led approach to land reform where the state
can only acquire property from willing sellers and refrains from using its
eminent domain power to expropriate. It emerged as the dominant land
reform paradigm following the end of the Cold War.90 Prior to this, the




89. For more information, see infra Part III.B.2 and accompanying text.
90. RoSSET, PATEL, & COURVILLE, PROMISED LAND: COMPETING VISIONS OF AGRAR-
IAN REFORM 18 (2006) ("The end of the Cold War heralded at least the temporary end of the
possibility of radical land reform programs. While it was inconceivable that land could redis-
tributed through a willing buyer-willing seller approach at the beginning of the Cold War, by
the Cold War's end it was inconceivable that it could be done any other way.").
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centralized process.9 In Southern Africa, negotiated land reform has
been implemented such that owners have near absolute power to decide
to whom, at what price, and on what terms they will sell their land, de-
spite the fact that expeditious land reform is necessary to address past
injustice and avert backlash. Consequently, negotiated land reform is a
powerful illustration of the classical conception.
As a constitutional matter, both the South African and Namibian
governments in theory have the power to use eminent domain to make
land available for land reform. But, in practice they do not, and it is
important to understand why. In the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement-
which was the independence constitution containing the negotiated terms
of Zimbabwe's political liberation-the post-colonial, democratic gov-
94ernment was restricted to negotiated land reform for the first ten years.
During this time, if the government decided to use its powers of eminent
domain, then, as a disincentive, it was forced to pay landowners just
compensation in scarce foreign currency.95 Since Zimbabwe set the blue-
print for the region's political transition, negotiated land reform would
become the norm in Namibia and South Africa, which gained independ-
ence years later.
Unlike Zimbabwe, eminent domain was never constitutionally cur-
tailed in Namibia and South Africa, but due in part to advice from the
World Bank, both countries refrain from using "t.96 World Bank econo-
mists have fervently advocated for negotiated land reform and against
91. Klaus Deininger, Making Negotiated Land Reform Work: Initial Experience from
Brazil, Colombia, and South Africa 2, 28-29 (World Bank, Dev. Res. Group, Working Paper
No. 2040, 1999). See generally id.
92. Michael Aliber & Reuben Mokoena, The Interaction between the Land Redistribu-
tion Programme and the Land Market in South Africa: A Perspective on the Willing-
Buyer/Willing-Seller Approach (Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, Occasional Paper
No. 21, 2002); see Deininger, supra note 92, at 9-10 (describing how the landlord's power to
decide the particular buyer and sale price created collusion between the buyer and seller, re-
sulting in overstated property values).
93. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 25; NAMIB. CONST. 1990 art. 16(2). See also ANDRE
VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES 309-58 (Juta & Co. 1999).
94. Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Conference Held, London, Eng., Sept. 10-Dec.
15, 1979, Lancaster House Agreement (Dec. 21, 1979).
In its place Britain offered a compromise under which, in return for the Zimbabwe-
ans guaranteeing existing property rights, the British would underwrite half the
costs of a resettlement program. Land could change hands only on a 'willing seller,
willing buyer' basis. Thus whites who wished to keep their farms were free to do
so; there would be no expropriation of land.
Robin Palmer, Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990, 89 AFR. AFFAIRS 163, 166 (1990).
95. See Mlambo, supra note 50, at 72-73.
96. HARRING & ODENDAAL, supra note 8, at 11; Ruth Hall, supra note 61, at 258; Kaa-
pama, supra note 60, at 34-38.
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eminent domain.97 More importantly, these economists have set the tone
for what other foreign donors and investors view as acceptable land re-
form policies. Since Southern African countries require foreign
assistance and investment to complete their land reform programs, the
governments are somewhat constrained by the neoliberal views of these
influential economists? 8
But, the story of why negotiated land reform has been the prevailing
policy is more complicated than this. In South Africa, for example, the
landless poor and their civil society representatives want the ruling party,
the African National Congress (ANC), to drastically decrease its empha-
sis on negotiated land reform. At the Land Summit, the landmark land
reform meeting involving South African civil society and government,
participants overwhelmingly identified negotiated land reform as the
major obstacle to timely land reform.99 On the other hand, white farmers,
their civil society representatives, and the World Bank have encouraged
97. Marc Wegerif, A Critical Appraisal of South Africa's Market-based Land Reform
Policy: The Case of the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) Program
in Limpop 9 (Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, Research Report No. 19, 2004),
available at http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001269/P1506-RR_19 Marc-Wegerif.pdf
("The World Bank, along with allied academics, had started to engage in policy debates in
South Africa from 1990, and they appear to have had a strong influence on policy develop-
ment with their proposals for a market-based land reform model."). See Yolandi Groenewald,
Mass Land Grabs Dismissed, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Johannesburg), Feb. 10, 2006, at 7 (quoting
senior World Bank economist Rogier van den Brink, who also argued that "[i]t is better for
government to negotiate a settlement with farmers" instead of using its expropriation powers
to compel purchases). See also KLAUS DEININGER, LAND RIGHTS AND ADMINISTRATION IN
AFRICA 2 (2004), http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdfs/G00l27.pdf (noting the threat of expropria-
tion has undermined tenure security and investment in many African countries). In addition to
negotiated land reform, World Bank economists also advocate for reforming land markets by
removing subdivision restrictions and instituting a land tax. R. van den Brink, Land Reform
Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Consensus and Controversy, in LAND REFORM 14 (2003),
available at http://www.landcoalition.org/pdf/wbqrdbaf.pdf; Ben Cousins, Comments, in
LAND REFORM, supra, at 43.
98. Id. Regarding the influence of the neoliberal governance model:
It is equally important to acknowledge that the Namibian transition to independence
coincided with the ascendance of the neoliberal governance model. Not only was
this model seen as a viable idiom for state design and reconstruction, but also its
adoption became a prerequisite for the accommodation of emerging and/or re-
formed states within the context of the international politics of development aid, aid
that was instantaneously needed to kick-start their reconstruction and development
processes. Thus, the need to embrace the principle of economic neo-liberalism is
said to have arisen from these geopolitical shifts at the global level.
Kaapama, supra note 60, at 35.
99. See, e.g., Thozi Gwanya, Acting Dir. Gen., S. Afr. Dep't of Land Aff., Impact
Assessment of Land Reform in South Africa, slide 20, Remarks at the World Bank Conf.
(Feb. 15, 2008) available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTIE/Resources/
WorldBankConference 1415 February2008-TGwanya.ppt (last accessed Apr. 27, 2010).
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the ANC to continue with negotiated land reform.'" Gibson's empirical
work further highlights these opposing views, finding that "a majority of
blacks, Coloured people, and those of Asian origin support going further
than existing policy to force landowners to sell some of their property to
the government for purposes of redistribution. A majority of whites op-
pose expanding the policy."'0 '
Although those advocating for increased use of eminent domain
have significant electoral power, those lobbying for negotiated land re-
form have immense economic power. If the ANC spurns foreign donors
or upsets local investors by more aggressively using its powers of emi-
nent domain, then investment is likely to decrease. On the other hand,
since there is no viable opposition party in South Africa, the ANC faces
no genuine threat of electoral defeat at the national level. 0 2 In the 2009
national elections, for example, the ANC retained power with sixty six
percent of the vote.'"3 This suggests that the consequences of rattling
those with economic power are conspicuous and potentially severe,
while the consequences of agitating those with electoral power are less
apparent. As a result, the ANC has made a strategic choice to pacify
those with economic power and continue with negotiated land reform
against the wishes of the majority.'04
100. See Rogier van den Brink et al., Consensus, Confusion and Controversy 35 (World
Bank, Working Paper No. 71, 2006), available at http://knowledgebase.terrafrica.org/
fileadmin/user upload/terrafrica/docs/34515OConsensuO 101OFFICIALOUSEOONLY 1 .pdf
(arguing that South Africa's market-assisted land redistribution programs have been successful
at transferring land "at reasonable cost and speed"); AGRI SA, Submission on the Expropria-
tion Bill [B16-2008], at 18 (May 14, 2008), available at http://www.pmg.org.za/report/
20080617-expropriation-bill-public-hearings (follow "AGRI SA Submission" hyperlink) (last
visited July 6, 2010) (arguing that expropriation should be used only "as a measure of last
resort" and subject to fairness and transparency); DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE PARTY, LAND RE-
FORM AND THE WILLING BUYER, WILLING SELLER PRINCIPLE 1 , available at
http://www.da.org.za/docs/566/willingbuyerwillingseller document.pdf (last visited Aug. 6,
2010) (favoring a market-oriented approach and blaming the slow progress of land reform on
"inefficient management and a lack of financial commitment on the part of the state.").
101. GIBSON, supra note 30, at 68-69.
102. See Barry Bearak, South African Voters Grumble, but Favor the Party in Power,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at A6 (noting that the ruling political party for the past 15 years,
the ANC, retains its power despite disappointment among voters because the Democratic Alli-
ance, the only potential challenge to the ANC, still failed to garner a majority of the votes; and
Congress of the People (COPE), the splinter group recently created from within the ANC,
developed disputes of its own).
103. See S. AFR. ELECTORAL COMM'N., RESULTS REPORT (2009), available at
http://www.elections.org.za (follow "Results Report" hyperlink; then select "22 Apr 2009
National Election"; then select "<All Provinces>"; then follow "View Report" hyperlink) (last
visited Apr. 27, 2010).
104. For a more detailed discussion about race and class dynamics behind the ANC's
reluctance to implement more radical land reform, see Jeremy Seekings & Nicoli Nattrass,
Class, Distribution and Redistribution in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 50 TRANSFORMATION 1,
10 (2002) ("The semi -privileged position of politically powerful African groups-including
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Zimbabwe faced a similar political calculus in the late 1980s. But, as
soon as its ruling party (ZANU-PF) realized that a precipitous change in
the political tide was upon them and the unresolved land question would
be the impetus behind the political establishment's potential defeat, the
government began facilitating hasty, violent land expropriations.'° To be
sure, there are many important differences between present-day South
Africa and Zimbabwe in the late 1990s-namely, South Africa has a
much more independent judiciary, which can stop the executive branch
from engaging in illegal land grabs. However, in the future, should the
ANC consider the unresolved land question to be a key factor in its im-
pending political defeat, the ANC could potentially take actions similar
to those of the ZANU-PF.
The international community is betting on the fact that the electoral
calculus will not shift drastically in South Africa, thereby making hasty
land expropriations necessary for the ANC to maintain power. This is an
immensely risky bet to make. A safer bet for the international commu-
nity is to facilitate the timely and orderly redistribution of real property
before the situation severely deteriorates. 106 The World Bank and other
international actors must understand that the classical conception's em-
phasis on negotiated land reform is causing reform to move at a dilatory
pace, which can have potentially fatal consequences. The state must use
eminent domain more aggressively to redistribute property.
Even in the relatively few instances where South Africa has used its
constitutional power of eminent domain to make land available for land
reform, the classical conception undermined the transformative potential
of this Section. Section 25(3) demands that the state employ a contextual
understanding of just compensation that considers several equity enhanc-
ing factors. Section 25(3) states,
The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of
payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable bal-
ance between the public interest and the interests of those
affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, includ-
ing-(a) the current use of the property; (b) the history of the
the urban, industrial working class, sections of the intermediate class and the semi-
professional class (especially teachers)-gives them good reasons to oppose a universal wel-
fare system in that radical welfare reform would require increased taxation on them, making
them subsidizers of the poor rather than beneficiaries of redistribution from the rich.").
105. William H. Shaw, They Stole Our Land: Debating the Expropriation of White
Farms in Zimbabwe, 41 J. MODERN AFR. STUD. 75, 76 (2003) (discussing Mugabe's increas-
ing unpopularity and the volatile political climate preceding the implementation of the fast
track plan).
106. See Atuahene, supra note 3, at 851-59 (arguing a Legitimacy Enhancing Compen-
sation Program (LECP) can temper property-related disobedience).
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acquisition and use of the property; (c) the market value of the
property; (d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in
the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the prop-
erty; and (e) the purpose of the expropriation."'
These equity enhancing factors are a key part of the liberation bargain.
Whites kept land acquired during Apartheid and Colonialism despite the
circumstances of acquisition; but, if the government needs to expropriate
the land post-Apartheid, then the circumstances of acquisition will de-
termine what amount of compensation is just. According to Section
25(3), the Fair Market Value (FMV) should be just a starting point for
determining just compensation rather than the final sum current owners
are entitled to.' 8
Despite this progressive constitutional provision, my interview with
Blessing Mphela, the Chief Land Claims Commissioner, revealed that
when the government acquires property through negotiated land reform,
in practice, the price paid often only reflects the FMV and not the other
equity enhancing factors enumerated in Section 25(3) of the Constitu-
tion.'09 Evidently, this is because the service providers the government
hires to do the valuation sometimes do substandard work and submit
estimates that do not take into account the equity enhancing factors. " '
Even if the service providers do their job properly, the government often
pays landowners FMV because, as Mr. Mphela explained, "We don't like
to refer disputes around price to the court because it will take forever. It
can drag on for over two years before the matter is resolved.""
This practice of paying FMV without considering the equity enhanc-
ing factors exhibits a myopic understanding of just compensation, causes
the state to overpay landowners, undermines an important piece of the
liberation bargain made in 1994, and treats owners as if they have no
duties arising from South Africa's history of land dispossession. While
Section 25(3) appears to embrace a transformative conception of prop-
erty, in practice, the classical conception prevails because the state gives
existing owners more protection than even the constitution requires. Ul-
107. S. AFR. CONsI. 1996 § 25(3).
108. Id. See also Ash and Others v Dep't of Land Aff. 2000 (2) All SA 26 (LCC) at 40 (S.
Afr.) (stating that for determining just and equitable compensation, "equitable balance re-
quired by the Constitution for the determination of just and equitable compensation will in
most cases best be achieved by first determining the market value of the property and thereaf-
ter by subtracting from or adding to the amount of the market value, as other relevant
circumstances may require").
109. Interview with Blessing Mphela, Acting Chief Land Claims Comm'r, Dep't of Land
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timately, this undermines the state's efforts to vindicate the rights of dis-
possessed populations.
In this section, I have explored two of South Africa's constitutional
property clauses. I argued that the government's implementation of the
provisions reflects a classical conception of property, which has eviscer-
ated the transformative potential of these constitutional provisions."'
C. The Classical Conception Critiqued
The classical conception is predicated upon owner control, and
hence any policy that interferes with owner control-like eminent do-
main, for example-is discouraged. In the context of Southern Africa, I
argue that the classical conception and its distaste for eminent domain is
not appropriate. I then move beyond the Southern African context and
the specific issue of eminent domain under Section 25(3) to explore why
the classical conception is not justified when the legitimacy of property
rights is in question.
1. Weaknesses of Negotiated Land Reform
In the context of Southern Africa, the classical conception, its em-
phasis on negotiated land reform, and its rejection of eminent domain
has several weaknesses. First, relying upon willing sellers often under-
mines the state's planning capacity because the government cannot
condemn and acquire contiguous parcels of land in a specific area. Con-
demning blocks of land is advantageous and efficient because it allows
the state to capitalize upon economies of scale by, for instance, building
an irrigation infrastructure to service numerous resettled individuals and
families.
Second, negotiated land reform gives landowners the upper hand in
land negotiations, which can result in the state paying inflated prices for
land.' 3 Aliber and Mokoena argue that this is because of the small sup-
ply of farms for sale, the high demand for particular properties due to
ancestral connections or proximity to established communities, and the
high transaction costs involved in rejecting the landowner's offer and
starting the process again.' 14 Third, the quality of the land available
112. Id.
113. Wietersheim, supra note 6, at 60 (2008) ("'There are many willing buyers in the
market looking for land, but they end up being frustrated by abnormal prices, insufficient
capital, government bureaucracy, and most importantly by the unwillingness on the part of the
current owners to sell the land.' By keeping prices of farms high, according to Kandjii, 'com-
mercial farmers are making sure that the yesterday "have-nots" remain the "have-nots" of the
day after tomorrow.' "). See supra note 92.
114. Aliber & Mokoena, supra note 92, at 24.
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through negotiated land reform is more likely to be sub-standard." 5
Landowners with thriving farms are not likely to want to sell a profitable
enterprise, while unprofitable farms with degraded land are more likely
to be willingly sold.
Fourth, a pervasive and potentially fatal problem with negotiated
land reform is that it is too slow."6 This is true in Namibia, South Africa,
and Zimbabwe. In an address to the nation, the Namibian Prime Minister
Theo-Ben Gurirab stated that, "[o]ver the years, the government has
come to realize that the 'willing-seller-willing-buyer' approach is cum-
bersome and as a result, it would not be able to keep up with the high
public demand for agricultural land."" 7 In 1994, South Africa, advised by
the World Bank, modestly aimed to redistribute thirty percent of the
country's agricultural land in five years, but less than one percent was
redistributed by 1999, less than three percent by 2003, and less than five
percent by 2008."1 In Zimbabwe, the slow process was one key reason
behind the great backlash that has led to the destabilization of a once
great nation.
Despite the sluggish pace of land reform, World Bank economists
argue that negotiated land reform is still a better option than eminent
domain because of:
115. Commenting on the factors that diminish the quality of land reform:
The bureaucratic complexity of the process does not make it attractive to landown-
ers, while limited grant sizes, limited budgets, lengthy and restrictive approval
processes and landowner prejudice combine to ensure that would-be land reform
beneficiaries are restricted to a small proportion of the land coming onto the market
every year, and often end up with land that is of relatively poor quality and more
extensive than they would wish.
Edward Lahiff, 'Willing Buyer Willing Seller': South Africa's Failed Experiment in Market
Led Agrarian Reform, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 1577, 1586 (2007).
116. See Wegerif, supra note 97, at 8; Edward Lahiff, supra note 115, at 1581-83. (de-
tailing the time-consuming market-based land reform process and noting the slow pace and
inability to meet objectives "makes it unlikely that it can ever be a means of large-scale redis-
tribution"); Groenewald, supra note 97 (noting that during the State of the Nation speech,
President Thabo Mbeki said that "the Land Affairs Department would review the 'willing-
seller, willing-buyer' principle to speed up land reform").
117. Uazuva Kaumbi, Land Reform: Namibia Moves into the Fast Lane, 428 NEw AFR.
28, 30 (2004). See also David Shriver, Rectifving Land Ownership Disparities Through Ex-
propriation: Why Recent Land Reform Measures in Namibia Are Unconstitutional and
Unnecessary, 15 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 419, 429 (2005) ("The success, or lack
thereof, of the willing-seller, willing-buyer approach is a source of significant contention in
Namibia because the program has been inefficient and sluggish."); WIETERSHEIM, supra note
6, at 87 ("So far (September 2008) only five white farms have been expropriated, a ridicu-
lously small number after 18 years of independence.").
118. See Ruth Hall, supra note 61, at 257; DEP'T LAND AFF. ANN. REP., supra note 8, at
9 (acknowledging that the Department of Land Affairs had distributed only 4.3% of the target,
which was to transfer 30% of white-owned agricultural land by 2014).
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the need to maintain public confidence in the land market and
more generally to affirm the government's respect for individual
property rights. It also reflects the recognition that expropriation
in other countries has failed to provide rapid access to land for a
large number of people, instead degenerating into lengthy politi-
cal maneuvering and rent- seeking.19
I disagree with this position for four reasons.
First, these economists' notion of protecting individual property
rights is quite shallow because it exclusively refers to the rights of cur-
rent titleholders and potential investors. A more robust protection of
property rights would include not only these well-positioned popula-
tions, but also the property rights of individuals and families who were
unjustly dispossessed. Land dispossession has severely impoverished
many individuals and families by depriving them of their primary asset.
If a state protects only the property rights of the economically well-
heeled and ignores those of its most vulnerable citizens, then can it truly
claim to respect property rights?
Second, in defending their preference for negotiated land reform,
World Bank economists argue that corrupt, highly centralized bureaucra-
cies have consistently undermined state-led land reform efforts in other
countries."2 Although corruption poses an undeniable risk to land re-
form, to defend their position World Bank economists must demonstrate
that increasing the use of eminent domain would make the state more
vulnerable to corruption than relying primarily on negotiated land re-
form. Evidence from South Africa should make us skeptical of this
claim.
For example, the Mpumalanga Land Claims Commissioner was re-
moved because he colluded with speculators to inflate sale prices, and
the Limpopo Land Claims Commissioner stood trial for misappropriat-
ing compensation set aside for displaced residents. 1 ' This suggests that
corruption is also capable of subverting land reform efforts whether the
state increases its use of eminent domain or continues to rely on negoti-
ated land reform. The goal should be to devise mechanisms to increase
transparency and prevent corruption regardless of what method of land
reform a state adopts.
119. Klaus Deininger, Making Market Assisted Land Reform Work: Initial Experience
from Columbia, Brazil, and South Africa, in AGRICULTURE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: PER-
SPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE RURAL DEVELOPMENT 156, 169 (Ernst Lutz ed. 1998).
120. Deininger, supra note 91, at 2, 9-10.
121. Sydney Masinga, Land Commissioner Out of Job, NEws24.coM, July 14, 2008,
http://www.news24.com/News24/SouthAfrica/News/0,,2-7 -1442_2357202,00.html (last
visited Apr. 29, 2010); Ogen Vos, Land-Reform Boss Charged, THE CITIZEN, Jan. 9, 2008,
http://www.citizen.co.za/index/article.aspx?pDesc=55857,1,22 (last visited Apr. 29, 2010).
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Third, from the perspective of World Bank economists, it is more
time consuming and financially costly to move away from the classical
conception and allow eminent domain to assume a more prominent role
in land reform because due process requires various layers of judicial
appeals. 2  As a result, these economist do not recommend using eminent
domain.123 But, is the appropriate response to streamline the eminent
domain process to make it more expedient, transparent, and efficient or
to shy away from it altogether as recommended by these economists?
The answer depends on the nation's legal framework, the level of politi-
cal will, and the quality of its courts and implementing bureaucracy.
There is no one size fits all. Therefore, increased use of eminent domain
may be a gainful option in certain states, but not in others.
Fourth, maintaining public confidence in the land market is the main
reason for South Africa and Namibia's obdurate commitment to the clas-
sical conception and its emphasis on the negotiated land reform. '14 The
most notable downside of expropriating land from unwilling sellers is
that this can make it difficult for owners to engage in long-term planning
because expropriation involves a degree of uncertainty that a state can
never fully mitigate. For example, the owner can never be certain if the
state will subject her land to expropriation or what exact price she will
receive if the state takes the land, and this uncertainty adversely affects
investment. 
125
But as I have argued, it is clear that if land reform continues at its
current dilatory pace, instability may prevail. Political instability is far
worse for the investment environment than strategic expropriation geared
towards making the land reform process more efficient. In addition, in
societies where animosity over the unfulfilled promise of land reform
threatens to destabilize the state, expropriation could potentially alleviate
more social tension and political polarization than it will cause. Zim-
babwe's present crisis was in large part fueled by the slow redistribution
of land. Thus, in order for the international community to ensure the
backlash experienced in Zimbabwe never happens again, it must realize
122. See VAN DEN BRINK ET AL., supra note 97, at 34.
123. Deininger, supra note 91, at 2, 9-10 ("The choice of negotiated land reform rather
than expropriation (which, as in Columbia, can still be used as an instrument of last resort)
was based on the need to maintain public confidence in the land market, and more generally to
affirm the government's respect for individual property rights.").
124. D.L. Carey Miller and Anne Pope, South African Land Reform, 44 J. AFR. LAw
167, 167-168 (2000) (describing the influence of Roman-Dutch philosophy, which is based on
the assumption that "absolute right of ownership provide[s] maximimum security of title").
125. See, e.g., Sarah Gavian & Marcel Fafchamps, Land Tenure and Allocative Effi-
ciency in Niger, 78 AM. J. AGRIC. EcON. 460, 469 (1996) (using survey data from Niger to
determine that tenure insecurity causes farmers to divert scarce resources to fields where there
is greater tenure security); sources infra note 139.
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that the extensive protection given to current landowners under the clas-
sical conception makes the process of land reform extremely
cumbersome and dangerously slow.
2. The Classical Conception Is Not Justified
When the Legitimacy of Property Rights Is in Question
There are three reasons why the classical conception is not justified
in Southern Africa as well as other places where the legitimacy of prop-
erty rights is in question. First, the theorists who have developed the
classical conception did not intend for it to apply in contexts where past
property theft was never rectified. Second, the classical conception
makes redistribution difficult, but when a significant portion of the popu-
lation is property-less, redistribution that gives everyone a baseline of
property can expand the zone of autonomy. Third, failing to redistribute
property can open the flood gates of societal fury and cause things to fall
apart.
First, the theorists who have developed the classical conception-
primarily John Locke and Robert Nozick-did not intend for it to apply
in contexts where past property theft was never rectified, causing severe
present-day inequality. One primary justification for the classical con-
ception is the labor theory of ownership developed by John Locke in the126
Second Treatise of Government. Locke and present day natural law
scholars assume that property rights are acquired through individual ef-
fort or free and fair market exchanges.127 Therefore, an individual's
property rights have been violated if the law restrains an owner's control
beyond what is necessary for the maintenance of order and protection of
other people's rights to control their property. 28 Locke, however,
126. According to Locke, each person has exclusive control over his body and his labor;
therefore, each person also has exclusive control over the property that he creates through his
labor:
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man
has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The la-
bour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in,
he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and the-
reby makes it his property.
See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 18 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publ'g 1980) (1690).
127. Id. at 20-21 (arguing that an individual may take as much property as she can make
use of before it spoils, ensuring that enough is left for others); Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regu-
lations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1568-69 (2003).
128. LOCKE, supra note 126, at 66, 68 (arguing that the chief end of government is to
preserve individuals' property and that government shall act only to ensure "the peace, safety,
and public good of the people").
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acknowledges that the labor theory has its limits. For example, private
ownership is legitimate so long as there is some property left over for
others. 9 Locke's labor theory does not apply in the context where past
property theft has led to severe present-day ownership inequality where
some people have so much property that others are left with none. This is
the case in South Africa where, in 1994, eighty seven percent of the land
was owned by whites who constituted less than ten percent of the popu-
lation.1 30 Under these conditions of severe inequality, Locke's labor
theory cannot justify the classical conception.
In Anarchy, State and Utopia, Robert Nozick tries to justify the prin-
ciples underpinning the classical conception by constructing an historical
entitlement theory that builds upon Locke's work.' The entitlement the-
ory is based on the assumption that people deserve their present property
holdings, so it is not meant to apply in situations where the connection
between past theft and present ownership undermines basic notions of
desert. Nozick argues that a person is entitled to their property and
minimal government interference with it if the principles of just acquisi-
tion and just transfer of property are satisfied. Nozick states that:
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the prin-
ciple of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the prin-
ciple of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the
holding, is entitled to the holding.
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applica-
tions of 1 and 2.132
If some injustice has occurred at any point of acquisition or transfer, No-
zick argues that minimal government intervention could be justified
through the principle of rectification, which corrects violations of the
first two principles. 1
3
129. Id. at 19 ("[F]or this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no
man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and
as good, left in common for others.").
130. Tooyen & Njobe-Mbuli, supra note 7, at 461.
131. See ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 150-53 (Basic Books 1974).
132. Id. at 151.
133. According to Nozick, the principle of rectification is crucial:
This principle uses historical information about previous situations and injustices
done in them (as defined by the first two principles of justice and rights against in-
terference), and information about the actual course of events that flowed from
these injustices, until the present, and it yields a description (or descriptions) of
holdings in the society. The principle of rectification presumably will make use of
its best estimate of subjunctive information about what would have occurred (or a
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Many critics have lambasted Nozick because he gives no content to
the principles of just acquisition, just transfer or rectification.'3 4 Nozick
himself admits that:
to turn these general outlines into a specific theory we would
have to specify the details of each of the three principles of jus-
tice in holding: the principle of acquisition of holding, the
principle of transfer of holdings, and the principle of rectifica-
tion of violations of the first two principle. I shall not attempt
that task here.'35
Although the principles lack specified content, it is hard to imagine a
state where these principles have never been violated. Although there
may be a society where, for the most part, hard work and individual
effort determine ownership, in the states this Article is concerned with-
that is, states where the current legitimacy of property rights is low be-
cause of rampant past property theft-the principles of just acquisition
and transfer have been egregiously violated. Therefore, according to
Nozick, unless the injustice is rectified, then the entitlement theory's
commitment to minimal government is not justified. Consequently, the
classical conception and its commitment to minimal government (which
includes the state not intervening to correct property imbalances) is not
justified. The transformative conception picks up where Nozick left off
by beginning to give content to the principle of rectification.
Second, even though the theorists who developed the classical con-
ception did not intend for it to apply in the context of past theft, one can
argue that the classical conception is justified because it may be neces-
sary to secure freedom. The classical conception and its emphasis on
limited interference with private property promotes freedom by ensuring
a zone of autonomy for the owner. In this zone, the owner's individuality
can develop and self-expression can flourish. For example, if a home-
owner wants to paint her house bright purple in a salute to her Mexican
heritage, she can; or if a homeowner chooses to live in a community
where everyone has contractually relinquished their right to paint their
home a bright color, she can do that too."' In addition, the autonomous
probability distribution over what might have occurred, using the expected value) if
the injustice had not taken place. If the actual description of holdings turns out not
to be one of the descriptions yielded by the principle, then one of the descriptions
yielded must be realized.
Id. at 152-53.
134. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 255 (1988).
135. NozIcK, supra note 131, at 153.
136. Renowned novelist, Sandra Cisneros, decided to paint her San Antonio home bright
purple and her neighbors unsuccessfully tried to force her to change the color by claiming that
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zone guarantees privacy so that owners can engage in acts not allowed in
public spaces, like being nude.
While I admit that a zone of autonomy is important even in societies
where ownership rights are hotly contested, as the legal realists have
pointed out, when a significant portion of the population is property-less,
redistribution that gives everyone a baseline of property can expand the
zone of autonomy.3 7 The state must not foil redistributive efforts by giv-
ing the same high level of property protection to the current owner's
primary home (where autonomy is crucial) as to her non-residential in-
vestment property, for example, where autonomy is less a factor.'
38
Third, the utilitarian justification for the classical conception is that
it maximizes societal wealth because people have an incentive to make
long-term investments in property when they can reasonably expect that
the future benefits will be secure. The assumption is that the classical
conception bolsters security by shielding titleholders from the govern-
ment and other third parties that may encroach on owner control. The
empirical evidence proves that when basic property protection exists,
investment thrives. '39 In these studies, the measure of basic property pro-
tection is based on, for example, whether owners are subject to arbitrary
expropriations without compensation.140 But, the existing empirical stud-
it did not fit with the rest of the Victorian homes and was "historically incorrect." Sara Rimer,
San Antonio Journal; Novelist's Purple Palette Is Not to Everyone's Taste, N.Y. TIMES, July
13, 1998, at A13.
137. See Cohen, supra note 78, at 18-19; Margaret Radin, Property as Personhood, 34
STAN. L. REv. 957, 957-1016 (1982).
138. See infra Part IV.A.
139. See, e.g., Holden & Yohannes, supra note 28, at 757 ("Many authors .. have ar-
gued that tenure insecurity discourages investment in land by removing the incentives for it, as
one may not be able to collect the expected flow of benefits of one's efforts if there looms a
threat of losing the land in the future."); Simon Johnson et al., Property Rights and Finance,
92 AM. EcoN. REv. 1335, 1351 (2002) (finding that "[t]he most insecure firms' investments"
were 39% lower than the investment of "[f]irms with the most secure property rights");
Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests
Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 EcoN. & POL. 207, 223 (1995) (finding that politi-
cal institutions that protect property rights are crucial to economic growth and investment);
Daniel Ayalew Ali et al., Property Rights in a Very Poor Country: Tenure Insecurity and In-
vestment in Ethiopia 24 (World Bank, Dev. Res. Group, Working Paper No. 4363, 2007)
(finding that Ethiopian farmers invest more heavily in their farms when transfer rights are
present and there is tenure security).
140. See generally Timothy J. Riddiough, The Economic Consequences of Regulatory
Taking Risk on Land Value and Development Activity, 41 J. URB. ECON. 56, 56-57 (1997). See
also Simon Johnson et al., Property Rights and Finance, 92 AMER. EcON. REV. 1335 (2002)
(arguing that "weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits, even when
bank loans are available. Where property rights are relatively strong, firms reinvest their prof-
its; where they are relatively weak, entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained
earnings." But, property rights were measured by responses to a survey asking entrepreneurs
whether firms in their industry make extralegal payments for licenses and government services
or payments for protection of their activities.); David Leblang, Property Rights, Democracy
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ies do not measure whether forbidding eminent domain and other similar
redistributive land policies increases investment. The empirical studies
confirm only that a basic level of property protection increases invest-
ment (i.e. no expropriations without compensation) and not the
heightened level of property protection required by the classical concep-
tion (i.e. no expropriations at all). Thus, the claim that the classical
conception increases investment is empirically unproven.
Even though it is unclear what exact level of property protection
gives owners the incentive to invest and develop their properties, we do
know that stability is a prerequisite to sustainable investment. Morris
Cohen, a renowned legal realist who wrote the classic article Property
and Sovereignty, argues that:
[c]ontinued possession creates expectations in the possessor and
in others and only a very poor morality would ignore the hard-
ship of frustrating these expectations and rendering human
relations insecure, even to correct some old flaws in the original
acquisition .... Any form of property which exists has therefore
a claim to continue until it can be shown that the effort to change
it is worth while.'
4'
In certain countries with a history of past theft that inspires present-day
backlash, honoring current expectations can open the flood gates of so-
cietal fury and can leave the state on the brink of collapse. In these
situations, human relations are rendered insecure not by disrupting exist-
ing expectations, but rather by the failure to disrupt existing expectations
built upon a foundation of past property dispossession and oppression.
The paradox is that the classical conception's promise of increased
investment requires political stability, but the classical conception's fo-
cus on protecting existing expectations can undermine land reform and
thereby promote wealth-reducing instability. 42 Thus, in certain contexts,
a transparent, accelerated reallocation of property rights-that is not in
line with the classical conception-can be the most efficient way to
promote investment and maximize wealth.
In this section, I have made four concise arguments that explain why
the classical conception is inappropriate in Southern Africa. I have also
and Economic Growth, 49 POL. RES. Q. 5 (1996) (arguing that "economies of nations that
protect property rights grow more rapidly than those of nations that do not protect property
rights." But, to measure property rights he uses data on the prevalence of exchange restrictions
and total credit allocated to private enterprise as a percentage of GDP).
141. Cohen, supra note 78, at 16.
142. There is growing evidence from all over the world that redistributive land reform
helped reduce poverty, increase efficiency, and establish the basis from sustained growth. See
supra note 67.
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provided three reasons why the classical conception is unjustifiable,
more generally, in countries where the legitimacy of property rights is in
question. It is now time to re-imagine the possibilities. It is time to ex-
plore a transformative conception of real property.
IV. THE TRANSFORMATIVE CONCEPTION
In this section, I begin by establishing the transformative concep-
tion's defining principles. The transformative conception is a unique
approach to property developed in this Article, but it is also rooted in the
work of legal realists, critical legal scholars, and African legal scholars
who have examined the ways in which property law can undermine
transformation. To further illustrate the transformative conception, I give
specific examples of how a state can apply it. I present three redistribu-
tive policies that can facilitate prompt land reform and explain why the
state can only implement the policies once it abandons the classical con-
ception and adopts a transformative conception. After providing a
comprehensive description of the transformative conception and demon-
strating how it would apply in practice, I critique it. I find that although
the transformative conception is far from perfect, it is a significant im-
provement over the classical conception in certain contexts.
A. The Transformative Conception Defined
The transformative conception is designed to address a problem ex-
perienced by many countries: a past regime stole real property from one
group and gave it to another. The two groups were often racially, ethni-
cally, or religiously distinct, which exacerbated the consequential
societal fissures and animosity.'4' The past theft never becomes a thing of
the past because wealth is an intergenerational phenomenon in that it is
accumulated during a person's lifetime and then passed along to kin.'
44
Likewise, disadvantage is also accumulated over subsequent generations
143. WORLD ON FIRE, supra note 20, at 6-7 (arguing that the volatile dynamic of ine-
quality produces social instability in the form of a backlash against market-dominant
minorities, democracy, and markets).
144. See MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH WHITE WEALTH: A
NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 6 (1997) (Oliver and Shapiro argue that "Just as
blacks have had 'cumulative disadvantages,' many whites have had 'cumulative advantages.'
Since wealth builds over a lifetime and is then passed along to kin, it is, from our perspective,
an essential indicator of black economic well-being. By focusing on wealth we discover how
black's socioeconomic status results from a socially layered accumulation of disadvantages
passed on from generation to generation."). See generally JOHN BRITTAIN, THE INHERITANCE
OF ECONOMIC STATUS (1977) (investigating social mobility and intergenerational transfer of
wealth using regression analysis to predict the son's economic status based on parental charac-
teristics).
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such that the devastating tremors from the initial theft of assets reverber-
ate through time.'45 As a result, in some countries the dispossessed group
presently occupies the lowest rungs on the economic ladder in large part
due to the fact that they have not recovered from the catastrophic deple-
tion of their assets; while the group that directly or indirectly benefited
from the past theft is economically dominant.' 46 Under these circum-
stances, a transfer of assets is needed to put the two groups on more
equal footing and ensure that past theft no longer debilitates future gen-
erations. 47 The classical conception, however, can make redistribution of
real property prohibitively expensive, perilously slow, or altogether im-
possible and hence is inappropriate when redistribution is vital.' 48 The
transformative conception has the potential to adequately address past
property theft because it gives countries the tools to expedite the transfer
of assets without bankrupting the state.
There are four defining principles of the transformative conception.
First, one of its major premises is that all property is not alike and thus
one uniform standard of protection is inappropriate. The classical con-
ception gives the same protection to a family's home on a farm, for
example, as it does to the 10006t acre of their farm. The transformative
conception strategically protects autonomy by giving the state the burden
of proving that certain modifications intended to facilitate the realloca-
tion and relegitimization of property rights are not justified (which is
akin to the heavy burden of proof under the classical conception) only
when the case involves modifying the property rights of someone's pri-
mary residence. 9
As Margaret Radin has argued, private property is essential because
it provides a sphere where the state has limited powers to intrude, creat-
ing a space where individuals can control their external environment so
145. BRITTAIN, supra note 144.
146. PETER RosSERT ET AL., PROMISED LAND: COMPETING VISIONS OF AGRARIAN RE-
FORM 58-64 (2006) (detailing the historical background of South African land dispossession
and the resulting economic and racial disparities).
147. The transformative conception is agnostic as to whether the state implements land
reform that requires specific proof of past ownership or not. Under a proof-based framework,
the state's goal is to vindicate the rights of identifiable past owners of specific parcels of land,
so proof of prior ownership or occupation is the basis on which the state distributes compensa-
tion. The South African Land Restitution Program is a case in point. Under the alternative
framework-exemplified by the Namibian land reform program and the South African land
redistribution program-the state reallocates ownership rights without requiring an individual
or community to provide proof of past ownership. The primary concern is whether the benefi-
ciary is a member of a previously disadvantaged group.
148. See supra Part I.B.
149. The state should place a cap on the size of the primary homestead that will receive
heightened protection so that a person owning a 500-acre property cannot claim the entire
property constitutes her primary residence.
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individuality and autonomy can flourish. "0 To promote autonomy, every-
one deserves some basic amount of property for their home, even in
societies where the legitimacy of ownership rights is contested.'5 ' When
the homestead is not at issue, then under the transformative conception,
property owners' rights are not protected by a heavy burden of proof.
The transformative conception requires the state to commit to devising
context specific property rules and resist the temptation to formulate one
uniform standard of protection.
Second, the transformative conception requires the state to vindicate
the rights of both present title deed holders and past owners who were
unjustly dispossessed. The rhetoric of defending property rights is pow-
erful. But the essential, unexplored question is: at what point does the
state begin defending property rights? Under the classical conception,
the state only defends the property rights of present titleholders because
the underlying assumption is that all past acquisitions and transfers of
property were just or that any injustices have since been rectified. 1 2 The
classical conception does not tolerate the possibility that-due to a past
injustice-two or more parties have a valid claim to the same piece of
property. In contrast, the transformative conception fully embraces this
very real possibility. Under the transformative conception, the state de-
fends the property rights of both the present titleholder and past owners
who were unjustly dispossessed.
Third, while the classical conception focuses solely on uni-
directional demands titleholders can make on society, the transformative
conception requires the state to focus on the duties of titleholders and not
just their rights. The transformative conception expands the conversation
to include the duties titleholders owe to a society bruised by past prop-
erty theft. 153 Hohfeld famously argued that rights and duties are jural
150. See Radin, supra note 137, at 957-1016 (exploring the relationship between prop-
erty and personhood and concluding that "[a]t least some conventional property interests in
society ought to be recognized and preserved as personal," and "that right should be protected
to some extent against government invasion."). In many countries, including the US and South
Africa, the state already gives heightened protection to the homestead. See also Stephanie M.
Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093,
1099-1102 (2009) (listing the various forms of protections offered by the government that are
"grafted on to American property, bankruptcy, and tax law," including "[h]omestead exemp-
tions, tenancy by the entirety, and foreclosure-relief legislation [to] help owners to shield a
portion of their personal wealth from creditors and to retain their homes," tax benefits avail-
able to homeowners, and legislation limiting eminent domain for private redevelopment-
adopted by different states at varying levels).
151. Stem, supra note 150, at 1099-1102.
152. NOZICK, supra note 131, at 152-53.
153. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 16
(2000) (arguing that there is a tension between liberty and obligation. He argues that "[w]e
tend to reconcile this tension by privatizing obligation. After all, one might believe that owners
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correlatives--one cannot exist without the other. 5 4 If I have an exclusive
right to occupy a parcel of land, then you have a duty not to interfere
with my occupation. In the Southern African context, as a result of the
political compromise made by the liberation parties, titleholders have a
right to their existing property despite the potentially unfair circum-
stances of acquisition. But, they also have a duty to facilitate
redistribution. Likewise, those dispossessed by the past regime have a
duty to respect the rights of present titleholders, but they also have a
right to the vindication of their land rights.15' This mutually reinforcing
relationship between rights and duties is deeply embedded in the trans-
formative conception.
Fourth, the burden of proof is an important baseline for legal analy-
sis. Singer argues that "[t]he classical conception leads one to attempt to
identify the 'owner' and then to presume that the owner's interests pre-
vail in any dispute over use of the property unless some sufficiently
strong reason can be evinced to strip the owner of her rights. In this way,
the classical conception allocates burdens of proof."' 56 In contrast, the
transformative conception does not automatically place the burden of
proof on third parties. It requires the owner to bear the burden of proving
that certain modifications intended to facilitate the reallocation and rele-
gitimization of property rights are not justified."'
In addition to these four principles, there are several further distinc-
tions between the classical and transformative conceptions. The classical
conception assumes that property was acquired purely through
individual effort and thus abhors government's attempts to change the
property status quo. In contrast, the transformative conception acknowl-
edges that government policies have played a large role in shaping the
should be encouraged to act in a caring manner toward others but that it is wrong for govern-
ment to mandate such behavior.").
154. See WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN
JUDICIAL REASONING & OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 38 (W.W. Cook ed. 1920) ("If X has a right
against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is
under a duty toward X to stay off the place.").
155. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 25.
156. Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1457 (1996). SINGER, supra note 153, at 84 ("When judges
cannot figure out how to rule in a dispute between conflicting interests, values, or policies,
they often fall back on presumptions and burdens of persuasion. Traditional property law, to a
large extent, is about adopting those presumptions and allocating those burdens.").
157. See generally AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher et al. eds., 1993);
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); Heinz Kiug, Hybrid(ity)
Rules: Creating Local Law in a Globalized World, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUC-
TION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEw LEGAL ORTHODOXY 276 (Yves Dezalay &
Bryant G. Garth eds. 2002) (describing the negotiation process that led to the property provi-
sion in the South African Bill of Rights and explaining how the constitutional property
provision complicates transformation).
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present-day, inegalitarian property distribution and thus seeks to use
government policy to increase the property status quo's equity.
Also, the transformative conception is predicated upon the fact that
property rules play a significant role in structuring human relationships.
Under the classical conception, only the property claims of present title-
holders are recognized, and thus they are placed in a dominant societal
position. Those with valid historical claims are subordinate to titlehold-
ers, if acknowledged at all. 58 The transformative conception seeks to
mitigate this power asymmetry by protecting the rights of current title-
holders and also defending the rights of those unjustly dispossessed.
B. The Transformative Conception Applied
The specific policies that a nation adopts to address past theft are in-
formed by the conception of property it embraces. If a nation adopts the
transformative conception, then this will determine the range of policy
options that follow. Although the policy options available under the
transformative conception can facilitate land reform to address inequality
generally, this Article specifically argues in favor of eschewing the clas-
sical conception and implementing the transformative conception in the
extreme case, which is when inequality emanating from past property
theft has the potential to cause backlash and destabilize the state.'59 De-
stabilization is more likely to occur when the current society has a strong
collective memory of past property theft; when there are enduring con-
sequences of the past theft such as severe inequality; when the majority
or a mobilized minority was dispossessed; and, when the state's capacity
or willingness to prevent or subdue potential disobedience is weak.'60
When state destabilization is on the horizon (like in South Africa and
Namibia), redistribution is needed to keep things from falling apart. Pol-
icies resulting from the classical conception are particularly inapt at
facilitating timely land reform, but policies resulting from the transfor-
mative conception are ideal. If the political will exists, a state can
abandon the classical conception and use redistributive policies such as
the automatic right of first refusal, eminent domain, and mandatory land
rentals to redistribute land. In the following section, I explain each policy
158. See WORLD ON FIRE, supra note 20, at 6 (noting how the racial and ethnic aspects to
this subordination animate the conflict). For a more on how race confers economic privilege,
see also Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Propere, 106 HARVARD L. REV. 1707, 1710 (1993)("In a
society structured on racial subordination, white privilege became an expectation and, to apply
Margaret Radin's concept, whiteness became the quintessential property for personhood.").
159. See, e.g., Atuahene, supra note 3, at 838 ("If a population begins to perceive that its
highly unequal property distribution is illegitimate, property-based disobedience may result if
the state's last line of defense-its coercive power-fails to secure compliance with law. There
is substantial evidence that economic inequality can lead to instability").
160. See id.
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and why it is incompatible with the classical conception, but exemplary
of the transformative conception.
1. Automatic Right of First Refusal
Under the classical conception, all regulations that encroach upon an
owner's power to transfer her property are deeply suspect. But under the
transformative conception, regulations that are designed to remedy past
wrongs by facilitating land transfer are encouraged. For instance, an au-
tomatic Right of First Refusal (ROFR) for the state on pre-determined
lands is consistent with the transformative, but not the classical concep-• 161
tion. A ROFR is the right to enter into a contract to acquire an asset
from the owner on the exact or approximate transaction terms as a third
party.162 The state must exercise the ROFR within a reasonable time after
the owner notifies it of a tentative sale. After exercising its ROFR, if the
state does not provide payment for the land within a specified time, then
its rights extinguish automatically and the owner is free to sell the land
to the buyer. Under this redistributive tool, the owner bears the burden of
proving that the ROFR is not justified.
The automatic ROFR is valuable because it can increase the supply
of land available for redistribution. It can also give the state an opportu-
nity to seize upon owner sales that are below FMV and thus facilitate the
affordable acquisition of land for redistributive purposes. The potential
downside of an automatic ROFR is that there are transaction costs in
negotiating a sale agreement. If the state chooses to exercise its ROFR,
the potential buyer is not able to recover these costs; and ultimately, this
161. Namibia has something similar to a right of first refusal (ROFR) on its books. All
owners must first offer land to the state for purchase under negotiated land reform, but, if the
state refuses, owners can sell it to anyone else at their elected price. Shriver, supra note 117, at
429 ("Any owner who wishes to sell land within Namibia must first offer it to the GRN via the
Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation (Lands Ministry)."). This is not effective
because an owner can offer the land for sale to the government at one price and, if the state
refuses to purchase the land, the owner can offer it for sale at a lower price to a private party.
For example, an owner has the power to offer land to the government for $10 million and,
upon government refusal, offer the same land to a private party for $5 million. Under the
ROFR consistent with the transformative conception, the state can capitalize on the $5 million
sale even if the seller objects. See Kaumbi, supra note 7, at 30 (quoting Namibia's Prime Min-
ister confirming that "[t]he process has become too slow because of arbitrarily inflated land
prices"). Ultimately, the ROFR under the transformative conception should reduce an owner's
incentive to inflate the price offered to the state.
162. Marcel Kahan, An Economic Analysis of Rights of First Refusal 4 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for
Law & Bus., Working Paper No. 99-009, 1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract= 11382 (last visited Apr. 29, 2010) ("A right of first refusal requires the owner of the
property subject to the right to offer the property to the rightholder on the same terms as those
offered by a third party before the owner can sell the property to that third party.").
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can lead to a reduction in land sales.163 To mitigate this concern, states
can subsidize the potential buyer's transactions costs when it exercises
its ROFR. Another potential concern is that the ROFR will increase the
red tape involved with land sales and thereby introduce unnecessary inef-
ficiencies into the land market.' 64 This is why it is important that the
window of time that the government has to exercise its ROFR and pro-
vide payment is relatively short and that the option expires automatically
when the time period expires with no need for further government inter-
vention.
2. Eminent Domain
Eminent domain allows the state to acquire property against the
owner's will so long as it is for a public purpose and just or fair compen-
sation is paid. Eminent domain is widely considered a legitimate part of
a state's police power because it counteracts the undue power of intran-
sigent owners to obstruct or make the state's acquisition of land for a
valuable public purpose prohibitively expensive. Under the classical
conception, however, eminent domain is considered a serious infringe-
ment of an owner's rights to use and transfer her property and hence is
seriously discouraged.
It is important to note that western nations, like the US, did not
spurn eminent domain in their own land reform efforts. In the 1946 case
Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, Puerto Rico used its powers of
eminent domain to condemn 3,000 acres of land on the Island of Vieques
that was owned by Eastern Sugar Associates. 65 The condemnation was
part of an official strategy to end existing oligopolies, as well as "assist
in the creation of new landowners [and] facilitate the utilization of land
for the best public benefit."166 The First Circuit allowed the state to take
large corporate land holdings and distribute them to squatters and subsis-
163. See Hayley H. Chouinard, Auctions with and Without the Right of First Refusal and
National Park Service Concession Contracts, 87 AM. J. AGRIc. EcON. 1083, 1084 (2005)
(exploring how attaching a ROFR to auctioned contracts may lead to non-competitive bids and
fewer participants).
164. See Edward Lahiff, From 'Willing Seller Willing Buyer' to a People-Driven Land
Reform 2-3 (Programme for Land and Agrarian Stud., Policy Brief No. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.icarrd.org/es/proposals/Policyl 7.pdf (suggesting South Africa could end the land-
owner "veto over land reform" and ensure a better quantity and quality of land is available by
granting a ROFR to the state). Lahiff also notes, however, that giving the state a ROFR may
not necessarily lead to land availability and lower prices since "disagreement over price" and
"bureaucratic complexity and potential disruption to the land market" could make it less effec-
tive than expropriation. Id.
165. Puerto Rico v. E. Sugar Assoc., 156 F.2d 316, 319 (1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
772 (1946).
166. Id. at 318.
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tence farmers. 67 The court described the redistributive strategy as an ac-
ceptable public use under the Fifth Amendment; and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. 68 The same oligopoly that plagued the Puerto Rican
Island of Vieques also afflicted the islands of Hawaii, where the govern-
ment owned forty nine percent of the land while forty seven percent was
owned by seventy two private landowners.1 69 Consequently, the Hawaiian
Legislature enacted the 1967 Land Reform Act, where it used its powers
of eminent domain to purchase land from lessors and transfer it to long-
term lessees. 70 In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the US Supreme
Court unanimously ruled that Hawaii's land reform program-intended
to dismantle its land oligopoly-served a valid public purpose."'
Under the transformative conception, the state is encouraged to use
its power of eminent domain to facilitate land reform and end oligopo-
lies. Following the US example, states should consider land reform a
valid public purpose. More importantly, using South Africa as an exam-
ple, states should adopt a contextual understanding of just compensation
that legally establishes the FMV as part of a non-exhaustive list of con-
siderations, which can include current use, amount paid, capital
improvements, circumstances of acquisition, and all forms of govern-
ment subsidy invested in the land.'72 A state can, for example, subtract
past receipt of government subsidies from FMV and add a certain
amount to the FMV when there is a taking of a primary residence to
account for the subjective, non-market value attached to homes. ' The
167. Id. at 319.
168. Id. at 322-25.
169. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1994).
170. Id. at 233.
171. Id. at 243-45.
172. Land reform is a public purpose and
[t]he amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just
and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the in-
terests of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances including a. the
current use of the property; b. the history of the acquisition and use of the property;
c. the market value of the property; d. the extent of direct state investment and sub-
sidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and e.
the purpose of the expropriation.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 25. See also Ex parte Former Highlands Residents; In re: Ash v. Dep't
of Land Affairs 2000 (2) SA 26 (LCC) (stating that for determining just and equitable com-
pensation, equitable balance required by the Constitution will in most cases be best achieved
by first determining the market value of the property and thereafter by subtracting from or
adding to the amount of the market value, as other relevant circumstances may require).
173. See Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology
of Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 713, 748 (2008) (showing that even if there is a commendable purpose for the
taking, the justness of the taking is determined by the level of subjective attachment to the
property). James J. Kelly, "We Shall Not Be Moved": Urban Communities, Eminent Domain
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state may also consider disruption costs (including moving expenses and
loss of good will), which are customarily not included in compensation
calculations. 74
In the context of systematic past property theft, it is not appropriate
to assume that compensation should be automatically equivalent to the
FMV because property was sometimes not acquired on fair market
terms. If I, for instance, acquired a parcel of land from the former regime
at nominal cost, is it reasonable for me to demand FMV for that land
today? I deserve FMV when the state takes the improvements to the land
if I paid FMV for them, but it is unreasonable for me to expect to receive
FMV for the underlying land when I did not pay FMV to acquire it. The
transformative conception deconstructs this assumption of fair market
transactions and creates a new understanding of ownership that takes
into account the reality of how an owner actually acquired the land. Un-
der an eminent domain regime consistent with the transformative
conception, the owner has the burden of proving that only FMV should
apply and not a more contextual understanding of just compensation.
There are downsides to the transformative conception's approach to
eminent domain. First, the cost of land transactions will increase for
some owners because of the research required to assess the factors be-
yond the FMV that a state must take into consideration. Second, this
approach to eminent domain may discourage long-term investment and
planning if investors are unclear about what just compensation entails.
"Uncertainty of expropriation affects the uncertainty of returns and tends
to discourage investment for risk-averse decision makers.' '" 5 To encour-
age current owners to invest in their property, it is important that all
improvements created or fully paid for by them are entitled to FMV
upon expropriation so that owners can recoup their investment. Compen-
sation for the underlying land, however, should be subject to the
contextual understanding of just compensation.
3. Mandatory Land Rentals
In many countries, there is ample idle, yet productive land available
for redistribution. One consequence of extreme inequality is that there
are a few owners who often have more high quality land than they can
use productively. For instance, in 1980, sixty percent of large-scale
and the Socioeconomics of Just Compensation, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 923 (2006) (arguing
that traditional calculation of just compensation as a solely equitable remedy (FMV) fails to
compensate the property owner for intangible and future earnings, as well as non-monetary
value)
174. Kelly, supra note 173, at 923.
175. Jahangir Saleh, Property Rights Institutions and Investment 7 (World Bank, Work-
ing Paper No. 3311, 2004). See also supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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commercial land in Zimbabwe was completely unutilized.'7 6 Often, the
reason that states do not acquire this unutilized land is because of its
high cost and the competing claims on state resources.177 To overcome
this hurdle, states can differentiate productive and unproductive land and
subject unproductive land to long to medium term leases with the state.
In order to provide current owners with adequate notice, the state should
create a comprehensive list of uses that it is likely to classify as unpro-
ductive. Once the state classifies land as unproductive, the burden is on
the owner to prove that the classification is unjustified.
Under the classical conception, an owner can allow her fertile land
to lay fallow even when the state desperately needs it for redistribution
to dispossessed populations. But under the transformative conception,
owners have a duty to facilitate redistribution. For instance, if an indi-
vidual owns ten acres of land and she is only using six productively, then
the state can rent the remaining four acres for a five to forty year period
so long as it pays just compensation for the rental. If the owner objects,
then she has the burden of proving that the land use is productive and
hence not justifiably subject to a mandatory land rental. In essence,
mandatory land rentals are a creative form of eminent domain.""
For a cash-strapped state, the cost of renting land is often far more
feasible than buying it. Therefore, with mandatory land rentals, those
unjustly dispossessed will have access to land at a price the state can
afford. In their study about access to land, Sadoulet et al. convincingly
argue that even though rental is not a transfer of wealth, it does produce
welfare effects because in the long-run tenants can labor, build their
wealth, and eventually become owners. 79 The goal is to give the landless
short-term leases on unused but high quality land in order to increase the
land's productivity. The transformative conception makes a distinction
between land used productively and unproductively. It recognizes that
not all property is the same, so to encourage entrepreneurs to work hard
and increase the overall economic pie, all property does not require the
same level of protection. 80
176. Zimbabwe Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, Land Reform Pro-
gramme, http://www.lands.gov.zw/landreform/landreform.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
177. Shaw, supra note 105, at 76 ("During the 1990s, however, the pace of change
slowed, and disenchantment grew as meaningful and economically viable land reform turned
out to be more difficult and more expensive than expected.").
178. See supra Part IV.B.2.
179. See Elisabeth Sadoulet, Rinku Murgai, & Alain de Janvry, Access to Land via Land
Rental Markets, in ACCESS TO LAND, RURAL POVERTY, AND PUBLIC ACTION 196-229 (Alain
de Janvry et al. eds., 2001).
180. It is important that environmentally productive uses do not fall into the unproduc-
tive category. See generally CARL FOLKE ET AL., RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: BUILDING ADAPTIVE CAPACITY IN A WORLD OF TRANSFORMATIONS (2002)
available at http://www.sou.gov.se/mvb/pdf/resiliens.pdf (describing how drastic changes to
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An alternative measure for discouraging speculative land holding is
to increase the property tax on unproductive land. However, mandatory
land rental better serves the dual purpose of preventing speculation and
providing the landless with land. The key to making mandatory land ren-
tals work is transparency. The state must clearly define what it considers
productive and unproductive land to avert rent seeking behavior among
program administrators. 8 Also, the state should create and widely dis-
seminate model lease agreements to ensure that owners of unproductive
land have sufficient notice of the potential terms of the rental.
These three redistributive policies are consistent with the transfor-
mative conception's four defining principles. First, context is crucial.
The redistributive policies presented above are merely meant to be ex-
amples because a guiding principle of the transformative conception is
that not all policies are appropriate in all contexts. Similarly, the level of
state protection property receives is also dependent on the context. Thus,
to protect autonomy, the owner's primary homestead gets heightened
protection while property not used for the primary homestead does not.
Second, a defining feature of the transformative conception is the
need to vindicate the rights of both present and past owners. The redis-
tributive policies discussed are specifically designed to facilitate the
orderly and expeditious transfer of land to past owners who were un-
justly dispossessed while protecting the rights of current owners. Third,
in the context of pervasive past theft, all owners have a duty to facilitate
the orderly transfer of land. To count as an infringement on an owner's
property right under the transformative conception, the redistributive
policy must force her to substantially exceed her duty as a property
owner. In contrast, under the classical conception the sole focus is on an
owner's right to have near full control of her property and hence all en-
croachments on owner's control are considered unjust infringements.
Fourth, the premise underlying all the redistributive tools mentioned
above is that transforming the property ownership status quo and pro-
moting fairness and stability has priority over protecting existing
expectations and buttressing owner control. The transformative concep-
tion operationalizes this conscious moral judgment by requiring the
current owner to bear the burden of proving that the implementation of
the redistributive policy infringes on her property rights.
an environment can render a society unable to adequately adjust, which can lead to social
instability).
181. See generally John Mbaku & Chris Paul, Political Instability in Africa: A Rent-
Seeking Approach, 63 PUBLIC CHOICE 63, 63-72 (1989).
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In sum, the redistributive policies presented in this section are in-
compatible with the classical conception, but quintessential
manifestations of the transformative conception.
C. The Transformative Conception Critiqued
In this section, I enumerate the most pointed critiques of the trans-
formative conception and explain why I believe that, despite its
imperfections, it is still the best available option in certain situations
where past property theft threatens to cause backlash and destabilize the
current state.
The first critique of the transformative conception is that it is unnec-
essary because tax and transfer programs more efficiently redistribute
assets. Kaplow and Shavell argue that "redistribution through legal rules
offers no advantage over redistribution through the income tax system
and typically is less efficient." '182 Thus, while some economists may agree
that redistribution is necessary to prevent backlash, they may insist that
the redistributive mechanism should be tax and transfer programs rather
than altering property rules as required by the transformative• 183
conception. I acknowledge that when the transfer of real property is
not critical, tax and transfer programs may suffice. In certain states,
however, tax and transfer programs will not be sufficient because the
novel attributes of land make its actual transfer essential.
Land is unique in several ways: First, land often has an unquantifi-
able cultural value because it plays a key role in individual and group
identityH Communities are often spiritually and emotionally tied to the
land where their ancestors are buried. As a result, although a group or
individual may have been dispossessed long ago, past owners can still
182. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667-68 (1994).
183. Id.
184. Waldron, supra note 3, at 20 (1992). Nadler & Diamond expounded upon particular
factors that influence the cultural values and identity associated with land:
We use this term to capture all the reasons why owners might have a special at-
tachment to their property: the improvements they have made over the years using
their own labor and design ideas; the memories inexorably connected with the
property, including milestones like births, birthdays, and weddings, along with
mundane but no less important memories of everyday living; proximity to friends
and family; connections with others in the neighborhood that leverage social
capital; expression of personality; the ability of a home to provide opportunity to
maintain and express personal and group identity.
Nadler & Diamond, supra note 173, at 713 (2003). Angela R. Riley, Straight Stealing: To-
wards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property Protection, 80 WASH L. REv. 69 (2005)
(arguing that indigenous communities should have a legal right to protect their cultural iden-
tity).
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have a deep cultural connection to land that the passage of time does not
erode. Second, people's perceptions of inequality and unfairness are one
primary source of backlash."'5 Since land is a highly visible sign of
wealth, perceptions about inequality may not shift without the significant
transfer of real property. Third, land is the basis of sovereignty. If an op-
pressed indigenous majority does not reclaim land that was unjustly
dispossessed by an ethnically distinct market-dominant minority, then
political independence can ring hollow. 186 Fourth, in some societies land
is the most important means of production so access to land is the pri-
mary way to counteract poverty and marginalization. Therefore, while
some states can address inequality resulting from past theft through tax
and transfer programs, others require a new conception of property that
facilitates prompt land transfer.
The second critique of the transformative conception is its seeming
impracticality. That is, why would countries now shift course and im-
plement the transformative conception when they have failed to move
away from the classical conception in the past? In Southern Africa, for
example, before the state can implement the transformative conception it
has to jump one daunting hurdle-its fear of foreign divestment. But, the
current global economic crisis may significantly deflate this roadblock.
In the current economic climate, bank lending has decreased drastically
and the flow of money to the developing world has lessened.'87 With re-
duced foreign investment, the fear of disinvestment is also attenuated.
Also, the laissez faire, non-interventionist economic model associ-
ated with the classical conception is rapidly losing credibility given the
havoc it has wrought in the U.S. banking system. This means that the
external forces edifying the classical conception are weakening.'8 At the
same time, the internal demands of the poor for a wide range of redis-
tributive programs are becoming more fervent.8 9 Consequently, the
185. Mark Irving Lichbach, An Evaluation of "Does Economic Inequality Breed Politi-
cal Conflict?" Studies, 41 WORLD POL. 431, 456 (1989) ("In other words, [Deprived Actor]
theories generally suggest how psychological processes (both cognitive and emotional) inter-
vene and hence may turn grievances about economic inequality into political dissent."). See
sources cited supra note 31.
186. See Kaumbi, supra note 7, at 28.
187. E.S. Browning, Alistair MacDonald & Jonathan Cheng, Credit Scare Spreads in
U.S., Abroad: Fears of a Recession Spark a Global Selloff, New Pressure on the Fed, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 22, 2008, at Al ("U.S. and European investors, seeking to preserve their gains, are
repatriating money they invested in the developing world, helping drive those markets lower,
analysts say.").
188. Id.
189. Sam Moyo, The Land Question in Southern Africa: a Comparative View, in THE
LAND QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSFORMATION AND REDISTRIBU-
TION 60, 74 (Lungisile Ntsebeza & Ruth Hall eds., 2007) (noting that "recent experiences of
rural land occupations in Zimbabwe and in peri-urban South Africa and Namibia show the
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governments of South Africa, Namibia, and other similarly situated na-
tions have a unique window of opportunity to implement the
transformative conception although they have failed in the past.
If the particular country's implementation of the transformative con-
ception is riddled by corruption and ineptness, then this will deter
investment. But, if the country successfully implements the transforma-
tive conception, then financial investment will continue to thrive and,
more importantly, the potential for backlash caused by past theft may
slowly attenuate.
The third critique of the transformative conception is that it assumes
redistribution will mitigate backlash. But, redistribution can also create
backlash if, for example, a violent minority wreaks havoc or a foreign
power precipitates instability in their opposition to the land reform pro-
gram. In Nicaragua, for instance, the US funded a military insurgency
(the CONTRAS), in part, to prevent the Sandinistas from instituting so-
cialism and a massive redistribution of property.'9° Consequently, the
Sandinista land reform program was compromised because the state had
to spend a significant portion of its budget on military operations, leav-
ing scarce funding for its land reform program.' 9' Thus, states should
carefully consider not only the backlash that land reform is intended to
mitigate, but also the backlash that it may create.
The fourth critique is that all the modifications to existing property
rights required by the transformative conception will affect those who
had varying degrees of complicity in the past property theft as well as
those who had no part in it at all. But, when the wrongdoer's identity is
blurred or the state is not able to hold her accountable due to the passage
of time, this is a necessary and unavoidable price that present landown-
ers must pay to ensure a stable future.'92
intensity of popular demand for land redistribution among a diverse range of beneficiaries
such as the rural landless, ... the rural poor, [and] the urban poor .... "). See also sources
cited supra note 31.
190. Abu-Lughod, supra note 67, at 34; See Everingham, supra note 67.
191. See W. Gordon West, The Sandinista Record on Human Rights in Nicaragua, 22
DROIT ET SOCIETI 393, 401 (1992) ("In response, whereas Nicaraguan military spending
constituted only 7% of the 1980 and 1981 national budgets, the figure had to rise through 13%
(1982), 19% (1983), 25% (1984) to about 50% since.").
192. The identity of the wrongdoer is not always muddy. After World War II, for exam-
ple, France forced individuals occupying Jewish property to return it, even if they acquired it
legally from the Nazis, on the theory that they were complicit in the taking. Consequently,
property owners not directly involved or complicit in the taking did not have to shoulder the
primary burden of rectification. See Wouter Veraart, 'Reasonableness' or Strict Law? The
Postwar Restitution of Property Rights in the Netherlands and in France (1945-1952) 9-10
(Dec. 30, 2002) in YAD VASHEM-THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CONFRONTING
HISTORY: THE HISTORICAL COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY (noting that the strict restitution law in
France made it easier for former owners of property to get their land back because "the judge
was obliged to acknowledge the nullity of any transaction of property performed after the
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The fifth critique of the transformative conception is that the modifi-
cations may deprive the country of necessary capital by giving present
landowners an incentive to transfer wealth from real property to other
forms of wealth or out of the country all together. The modifications can
also impede foreign investment or alienate landowners, causing them to
emigrate with their capital and skills. To mitigate these concerns, the
state must set clear limits on its power to modify property rights, have a
transparent process for defining which properties are subject to rights
modification, and give owners ample notice of all impending changes.
Once the new rules have been announced to the public, the markets will
adjust. It is important to remember that while changing property rules
may adversely affect the investment environment, the failure to deliver
timely land reform may destroy it.
The sixth critique is that implementation of policies consistent with
the transformative conception requires a high level of bureaucratic ca-
pacity, which many transitional states do not have. In contrast, the
classical conception does not promote the state-led reordering of prop-
erty rights and thus policies consistent with it are not as severely affected
by bureaucratic incapacity. ROFR, eminent domain, and mandatory land
rentals, for example, are policies that require a skilled, accountable, and
transparent bureaucracy to implement them. The critique is that it is bet-
ter not to promote policies that redistribute property than to implement
redistributive policies that are undermined by corruption and ineptitude.
To attenuate this challenge, it is crucial that the international community
proactively intervene to assist nations in building the bureaucratic capac-
ity necessary to implement redistributive policies.
The seventh critique is that while the transformative conception fa-
cilitates land reform, what is needed is agrarian reform, which is land
reform implemented in concert with the socio-economic and political
reforms necessary to ensure land reform beneficiaries are successful.' 93
The real challenge of any land reform program is not just acquiring land,
but also ensuring that beneficiaries are able to use the land efficiently.'
94
original owner had lost his right to dispose of it. This meant that all the transactions performed
by so-called 'administrators' were null and void and had to be undone.") available at
http://wwwt.yadvashem.org/about-yadldepartments/institutelpdf/veraart-paper-revised-since
_conference-new.pdf. Southern Africa does not have this luxury because the identity of
wrongdoers is not as clear as it was in the Netherlands due to the passage of time between the
wrongful act and rectification.
193. See Saturnino M. Borras, Jr. et al., Agrarian Reform and Rural Development: His-
torical Overview and Current Issues 3 (ISS/UNDP, Land, Poverty & Pub. Action, Policy Paper
No. 1, 2007), available at http://www.iss.nl/content/download/3831/37212/file/ISS%20UNDP
%200verview%20paper.pdf.
194. See also Saturnino M. Borras, Jr., Questioning Market-Led Agrarian Reform: Ex-
periences from Brazil, Colombia and South Africa, 3 J. OF AGRARIAN CHANGE 367, 385
(2003) (noting that the lack of co-ordination between the Rural Development Program and
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To ensure success, the state is required to not only transfer title, but also
to provide post-settlement support, subdivide the farm, construct infra-
structure, and relocate people. The transformative conception, however,
only facilitates land acquisition and must be understood as the first of
several steps to achieving a more equitable property distribution.'
95
Despite the aforementioned criticisms, the transformative conception
is still a viable option for states where the lack of timely land reform
heightens the possibility of backlash and state destabilization. But, while
the transformative conception is necessary for expedited land reform, it
is ultimately a limited, technical legal solution. What is needed for com-
prehensive, lasting transformation is an accompanying political solution.
The transformative conception is one piece in a larger puzzle. The other
pieces I did not develop in this Article include how a state can: build a
transparent, efficient bureaucracy to implement state-led land reform;
choose who will benefit from land reform programs; ensure the court
system effectively protects the rights of current owners; and, create
effective agrarian reform policies. Every puzzle is solved one piece at a
time.
V. THE LIFESPAN OF THE TRANSFORMATIVE CONCEPTION
Depending on the context, the transformative conception may be ap-
propriate as a long-term policy, it may be suitable for a shorter period of
time and then reach its expiration point, or it may never be appropriate in
the first place. This section argues that the appropriateness and lifespan
of the transformative conception depends upon whether a state is more
Department of Land Affairs contributes to the failure in implementing farm and beneficiary
development).
195. While the focus of this Article is on how to transfer land more effectively, in prior
articles I have dealt with how to ensure land reform is successful. I argue that under certain
circumstances, dispossession involves more than just the confiscation of an individual or
community's property, it is about their removal from the social contract. When they are re-
moved, then they are subject to what I call property-induced invisibility. I argued that the
state's task in this instance is not just to give land to the dispossessed, but to do it such that
they are reintegrated into the social compact and made visible. While reparations deals exclu-
sively with providing compensation, at the core of restoration is giving the dispossessed a
choice as to how they are compensated so that they can decide the terms of their re-inclusion
into the social contract. The choices can include, for example, free higher education for two
generations, subsidized credit, cash, the actual land that was unjustly taken, or alternative land
if it is not available. Restoration allows land reform beneficiaries to choose from an array of
compensation options rather than only giving them the option of receiving land, even if they
do not have the skills or capital to use it effectively. Restoration-with its focus on choice-is
the key to moving from land to agrarian reform. See Bernadette Atuahene, From Reparation to
Restoration: Moving Beyond Restoring Property Rights to Restoring Political and Economic
Visibility, 60 SMU L. REV. 1419, 1444-45 (2007).
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prone to market or government failure. The section also develops a me-
chanism states can use to shift from the transformative conception to the
classical conception or vice versa.
When deciding whether to adopt the classical conception, the trans-
formative conception, or some hybrid of the two, decision makers must
realize that, while the classical conception is vulnerable to market fail-
ure, the transformative conception is subject to government failure.
Market failure is the idea that "the production and distribution of a
commodity through a competitive market in which all the relevant agents
are pursuing their own self-interest will result in an allocation of that
commodity that is socially inefficient."'96 For instance, market processes
can lead to a highly unequal and socially inefficient distribution of
land.'9 ' Insofar as the classical conception serves as a stumbling block to
fostering a socially efficient distribution of property, it is vulnerable to
market failure.
Alternatively, government failure "arises when government has cre-
ated inefficiencies because it should not have intervened in the first place
or when it could have solved a given problem or set of problems more
efficiently[.]' ' 98 The value of the transformative conception is that it fa-
cilitates government reallocation of property rights. However,
government failure can occur if lack of transparency, corruption, bureau-
cratic incapacity, or other inefficiencies undermine redistributive efforts.
The key to mitigating imperfections of a government-led approach is to
maintain effective checks on governmental power.
The judiciary plays an important role in limiting the government's
power, but the court walks a fine balance. It must protect the rights of
current owners. At the same time, when interpreting existing or new
property legislation, the court must reject the classical conception's se-
ductive siren song, which is the false assumption that all property was
acquired due to individual effort and thus the state should give it near
absolute protection to reward that effort. Also, once laws consistent with
the transformative conception are passed, those charged with implemen-
196. See Julianle Grand, The Theory of Government Failure, 21 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 423,
423 (1991).
197. Although many economists exclude distributional concerns from their evaluation of
market success and failure, "from one perspective, it is theoretically correct to consider distri-
butional inequity as an example of market failure. From this perspective, income distribution,
or equity as a general systemic attribute, is a particular type of public good." Charles Wolf, Jr.,
Market and Non-Market Failures: Comparison and Assessment, 7 J. PUB. POE'Y 43, 52
(1987).
198. CLIFFORD WINSTON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET FAILURE: MICRO-
ECONOMICS POLICY RESEARCH AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 3 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr.
for Reg. Stud. 2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2006/
09monetarypolicy-winston/20061003.pdf.
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tation will inevitably have some degree of discretion, and if this discre-
tion is abused in any way, it is important for the courts to promptly
intervene to correct the situation. Successfully implementing the trans-
formative conception involves the joint effort of the legislature and
judiciary.
Each state must carefully weigh the potential for and consequences
of market failure against that of government failure. If the potential for
market failure is more acute, then policies more in line with the trans-
formative conception are a viable option. However, if the potential for
government failure is overwhelming, then policies consistent with the
classical conception, which require less government intervention, are a
better option. South Africa and Namibia are susceptible to both market
and government failure. But, market failure is the more detrimental in
these countries because the consequences of not implementing redis-
tributive policies and allowing a socially inefficient land distribution to
endure are potentially explosive. These countries must implement poli-
cies in line with the transformative conception and rely on the
international community to help further strengthen their domestic bu-
reaucratic capacity.
Once a state decides which conception of property is more appropri-
ate, then there is the question of how a state can transition from where it
is to where it needs to be. The transformative conception is usually ideal
during the period in which society is changing from one set of values
based on exclusion and oppression to another based on inclusion and
fairness. This process of transformation may take five years or fifty;
there is no one size fits all. There may come a moment when redistribu-
tive efforts make substantial progress towards leveling the playing field
imbalanced by past property theft. Once there is a generalized belief that
present owners acquired their property fairly, the society may move to
the point where the vast majority of citizens believe that it is in their self-
interest to adopt a conception of property that prioritizes protecting own-
ers rather than facilitating land reform. At this point, the state can move
from the transformative conception to the classical conception or to
some hybrid of the two.
The Canadian Notwithstanding Clause of the Charter of Rights pro-
vides a practical example of how this transition can occur. Section 33(1)
of the Charter allows either Parliament or the provincial legislature to
expressly overrule certain sections of the Charter by passing an Act.' 99
199. David Johansen & Philip Rosen, The Notwithstanding Clause of the Charter 2 (The
Library of Parliament, Background Paper No. BP-194E, 2008) (Can.). The purpose of the
clause is to provide balance between the legislative and judicial branches, but in practice the
clause is rarely used. Id. at 8, 13.
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"Section 33(3) provides that each exercise of the notwithstanding power
has a lifespan of five years or less, after which it expires, unless Parlia-
ment or the legislature re-enacts it under section 33(4) for a further
period of five years or less.' '200 In effect, the overruling legislation has a
sunset clause, which forces politicians and society at large to deliberate
about the merits of the impugned section of the Charter. In the same spi-
rit, a state could enact property laws consistent with the transformative
conception, which will automatically expire in five years unless the leg-
islature re-enacts the laws for an additional period of five years or less.
Laws implementing the transformative conception should have a sunset
clause to encourage society to deliberate about the status of rectification
and the continued need for the transformative conception.
In sum, the transformative conception is not always the optimal con-
ception of property for a state to adopt. When it is, its optimal lifespan
varies; it could be two years, twenty years, or an indefinite period of
time. I have attempted to suggest the factors a state should consider
when determining its optimal conception of property. I have also pre-
sented a potential mechanism for transitioning from one conception to
another.
VI. CONCLUSION
The conception of property that a transitional state adopts is criti-
cally important because it affects the state's ability to transform society.
The classic conception of property gives property rights a certain sanc-
tity that allows owners to have near absolute control of their property.
Singer explains this when he argues that, "[w]hen ownership rights are
limited, we imagine those limits to be exceptions to the general rule that
owners can do whatever they want with their property. The burden is
always on others (meaning non-owners or the state) to explain why the
owner's rights should be limited, and in today's political climate that
burden is quite heavy.' 201 In countries where ownership is contested and
land reform is essential due to pervasive past property theft, the sanctity
given to property rights has made land reform difficult and thus has
served as a sanctuary for enduring inequality.
Oddly, the classical conception is flourishing in transitional states,
like South Africa and Namibia, where transformation of the property
status quo is essential for the state's stability. The virtue of the classical
conception is that it gives owners highly secure property rights, which
supposedly enhances the investment environment. But, in nations where
200. Id. at 2.
201. SINGER, supra note 153, at 3.
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past property theft can lead to backlash and destabilize the current state,
political instability could result if the state does not alter existing prop-
erty rights and redistribute land in an orderly fashion. Instability can be
far worse for the investment environment than redistributive policies;
nevertheless, the classic conception endures under these circumstances.
The specific question this Article addresses is: for states where past
property dispossession can cause backlash and destabilize the current
state, is the classical conception appropriate or do these states require an
alternative conception of real property? In Southern Africa, the state
robbed Africans of their lands because the property rights systems during
Apartheid and Colonialism were built upon a white supremacist ideol-
ogy. The transition from white minority rule to democracy ushered in a
radical change in values, so the property rights system cannot remain the
same. I develop the transformative conception to explore how the exigent
need for societal transformation should inspire us to rethink what a
state's commitment to protecting property rights means. Protecting prop-
erty rights cannot just be about protecting the rights of current owners; it
must also entail vindicating the rights of owners who have been unjustly
dispossessed by prior regimes.
